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Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets:
Should We Use Mediators in Deals?
ScoTr R. PEPPET*

This Article asks a simple question: Could third-party mediators be
helpful in deals, just as they are in disputes? This Article makes a theoretical
argument for such interventions, but also presents preliminary empirical
evidence suggesting that transactional mediation may already be taking
place.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have recently taken new interest in complex transactions
or deals. Several leading law schools now teach courses devoted to
dealmaking, l fellowships have been created in transactional studies, 2 law
reviews have held symposia on the topic,3 and recent books focus on the
4
lawyer's role in transactional bargaining.
Much of this scholarship has its roots in Ronald Gilson's now classic
5
article, Value Creationby Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing.
In that article, Gilson asks how lawyers create value for their transacting
clients. If the market is perfect and prices capital assets efficiently-as
finance theory often assumes 6 -there is little for a lawyer to do in a
commercial transaction other than engage in distributive bargaining and add
transaction costs. Gilson hypothesized, however, that the market does not
always price transactions efficiently. In the real world, transaction costs,
information asymmetries, strategic behavior, and other barriers to efficient
asset pricing sometimes stand in the way of closing deals. And in those
market imperfections lie a lawyer's opportunity. A business lawyer can use
representations, warranties, and other contractual devices to bring the real
world's imperfect market closer to the idealized world of efficient markets.
1 Ronald Gilson and Victor Goldberg offer a course at Columbia Law School titled

Deals: The Economic Structure of Transactions and Contracting. Gilson also offers a
similar course at Stanford Law School. Nancy Knauer and Eleanor Myers offer a course
tided Integrated Transactional Practice at Temple University's School of Law. Cornell
Law School offers courses on The Anatomy of a Deal and on The IPO Process and Deal
Structure Alternatives. For a discussion of the need to incorporate deals into the
traditional law school curriculum, see Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate
Transactionsinto the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 475 (2002).
2 Information on Columbia Law School's fellowship program is available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center-program/deals (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
3 For example, Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin organized a symposium on the
ways in which business lawyers add value to transactions. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert
H. Mnookin, Symposium, Business Lawyering and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1 (1995). In addition, a recent Michigan Law Review symposium focused on
commercial transactions. See Symposium, Empirical Research in Commercial
Transactions,98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000).
4 See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN
CONTEXT (2002); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (discussing dealmaking).
5 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).

6 Much of Gilson's article focuses on capital asset pricing theory. See id. at 250-51.
For our purposes, there is no reason to delve into the intricacies of the model.
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Gilson labeled this role "transaction cost engineering." For example,
whereas in a perfect world transacting parties would have similar information
and forecasts about the future performance of a commercial asset to be
traded, in the real world expectations often differ. This makes it difficult to
price that asset. One side may think the asset is worth a lot because the future
looks bright; the other side argues that future prospects are grim. Such
differences may lead to a negotiation breakdown and no deal. Lawyers can
bridge such gaps, however, using an "earnout contract" that makes payment
contingent on performance. 7 By using legal devices to minimize the impact
8
of market imperfections, a lawyer can add value to a transaction.
This Article takes Gilson's powerful explanation of the role of lawyers in
commercial transactions as the jumping-off point for a slightly different
inquiry into the dynamics of dealmaking. It focuses on the following paradox
implicit within Gilson's article. On the one hand, Gilson recognizes that
transaction costs, information asymmetries, and strategic behavior may keep
parties from consummating deals. This is what creates an opportunity for
lawyers to craft contracts that correct for these market imperfections. On the
other hand, lawyers may also fall prey to the same transaction costs,
information asymmetries, and strategic behavior as they negotiate. 9 In other
words, as lawyers try to negotiate contracts to help clients overcome these
barriers to reaching a deal, these same barriers may compromise the lawyers'
ability to do so.
This does not undermine Gilson's thesis-after all, lawyers may create
some value for their clients through transaction cost engineering, even if
these same transaction costs keep them from perfecting their task. It does
raise an interesting question, however. Is there a role for a different kind of
player in transactions-a player who could help parties, including business
lawyers, to overcome these various market imperfections as they negotiate
the terms and conditions of a deal? In particular, is there a role for neutral
intermediaries-or mediators-in dealmaking? We do not typically assume
that lawyers and clients involved in mergers and acquisitions, real estate
deals, and other complex transactions will seek the assistance of a neutral
mediator. But should they?
Over the past three decades, mediation has emerged as a pervasive
complement to traditional litigation. Disputants now routinely use mediators
to dispose of cases in a variety of contexts, including commercial litigation,
environmental disputes, employment problems, and mass torts. Mediators
7

Id. at 262.

8 Id. at

300.

9 Gilson recognized that transactional lawyers often engage in strategic behavior.
See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
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can help disputing parties overcome information asymmetries, optimize their
settlements, manage psychological barriers to negotiation, and cope with
emotional and relational issues. 10 In many ways, an impartial mediator is
uniquely suited to help parties overcome the various transaction costs that
can impede settlement.
In promoting mediation as an alternative to litigation, however,
13
12
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 11 contract, and law and economics
scholars have largely ignored the transactional realm. Although some have
briefly considered the possibility of "deal mediators," 1 4 no one has analyzed
in depth1 5 whether mediators can add value in closing mergers and
10 See infra Parts I and 11.
11
Itis always difficult to prove a negative. Still, the literature on mediation and
alternative dispute resolution fails to evidence much exploration of the use of mediators
in transactions. Several major treatments of the field, for example, contain no discussion
of this issue. See, e.g., EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1994)

(discussing various contexts in which mediation takes place but not mentioning
transactional mediation); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS (1996)
(same); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS (1996) (same).

12 Relational contract scholars since Ian Macneil have considered the use of
mediators to maintain long-term contractual relations. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Contractand Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 831; Thomas J. Stipanowich, The
Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities,13 OHIO ST. J.ON DISP. RESOL. 303 (1998)
[hereinafter Stipanowich, Multi-Door Contract]; see aslo IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 867 (1978). However, this literature has not explored the broader
possibilities for using mediators to aid in the creation of transactions. The inclusion of an
ADR clause is an ex ante means of controlling future disputing behavior through the use
of mediators, not the use of a mediator as a means of arriving at satisfactory and efficient
deal terms. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995) (exploring the difference between ex ante and ex
post decisions to employ mediators in a dispute resolution process).
13 Shavell, Ayres, and others have shown interest in the economic justifications for
the use of mediation to resolve litigation, but little attention has been paid to the
transactional context. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
14 See L. Michael Hager & Robert Pritchard, Deal Mediation: How ADR Techniques
Can Help Achieve Durable Agreements in the Global Markets, 14 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 2-3 (1999) (proposing a role for lawyer-mediators in international
transactions, particularly if cultural differences exist); see also CPR's Online Seminar:
TransactionalADR, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG., July-Aug. 2001, at 173
(transcript of panel discussion on the possibilities of transactional mediation).
15 The one major treatment of the topic is in Howard Raiffa's classic text on
bargaining, where Raiffa discusses the possibility of using mediators in mergers and
acquisitions. See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 91-118

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 19:2 2004]

acquisitions, joint ventures, or employment agreements, just as they do in
litigation. The few references to transactional mediation in the legal literature
16
mention it in passing and as part of a larger discussion of settling litigation.
In short, although it is well accepted that mediators can help to settle
lawsuits, it seems equally well accepted that there is little or no role for such
mediators in helping parties with commercial transactions.
This Article takes issue with this conventional wisdom. It argues that
many of the same barriers to negotiation that plague litigation settlement
(1982). Additionally, in the 1970s, two authors briefly discussed the somewhat different
idea of using joint representation to facilitate contracting, but neither explored the
possibility of using a true mediator for such purposes. See Roland A. Paul, A New Role
for Lawyers in Contract Negotiations, 62 A.B.A. J. 93 (1976) (lawyers as "middle
counsel" or "mediators" in commercial negotiations); James C. Hagy, Note,
Simultaneous Representation: TransactionResolution in the Adversary System, 28 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 86 (1977). Finally, building on Raiffa's analysis, an unpublished
manuscript by two colleagues at the Harvard Business School discusses the possibility of
using mediation in friendly mergers, but does not consider the full implications of
introducing mediators into deals. See Guhan Subramanian & James Sebenius, Why
Friendly Mergers Fail: Barriers to Achieving Value-Creating Mergers and a Proposal for
Mediation (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also Frank E.A. Sander &
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Janus Quality of Negotiation: Dealmaking and Dispute Settlement,
4 NEGOT. J. 109 (1988) (describing the differences between dispute settlement and dealmaking).
16 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT
469-70, 492-96 (4th ed. 2001) (prescribing mediator intervention in transactions but
offering no analysis of how it would benefit parties); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 313 (2d. ed. 1997) (stating that "[iun
mediation, an impartial third party helps others negotiate to resolve a dispute or plan a
transaction" but not analyzing transactional mediation); STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE
DISPuTE RESOLUTION 203 (2001) (dividing mediation into transactional and dispute
mediation and noting that transactional mediation is less common and "only rarely
mentioned in this chapter"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalismin NonAdversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 162 (1999) (discussing "new forms
of appropriate dispute resolution, even in transactional work, or 'transactional ADR' but
not discussing transactional mediation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Problem-Solver and Third-Party Mediator: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in
Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 804 (1999) (mentioning that lawyer-mediators may
work to solve "litigational or transactional problems" but only analyzing disputes);
Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 19-20 (1996) (discussing the
mediation of "business interests" and suggesting briefly that a mediator might assist with
contract renegotiation or with the creation of a new joint venture); Jeswald W. Salacuse,
After the Contract, What? Negotiating to Work Successfully with a Foreign Partner,2
CAN. INT'L. LAW. 195, 198 (1997) (discussing the use of mediators in management of
long-term international partnerships, but mentioning that a mediator might help in the
"deal making" phase as well).
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exist in commercial transactions, particularlyduring the closing stage of a
deal when lawyers attempt to negotiate terms and conditions. It further
argues that a transactional mediator could help lawyers and clients to
overcome such barriers. By a "transactional mediator," I mean an impartial
person or entity that intervenes in a transactional negotiation pre-closing to
17
facilitate the creation of a durable and efficient contract.
Although this argument is novel, it has a deep foundation in economics.
Economists have recently placed increasing importance on the ways in which
intermediation helps parties to transact in imperfect markets. 18 When a
market is plagued by some transaction cost that parties cannot overcome
directly, third parties that can diminish that cost will arise and begin to play a
role in that market. In illiquid markets, for example, an intermediary can add
value by holding inventory or cash, thereby eliminating market failures that
would otherwise occur if a buyer was not always available to purchase at the
precise moment that a seller was ready to sell (e.g., dealers in stock
markets). 19 In markets with high search costs, an intermediary can help to
17 My use of the term differs from those who have used the term "transactional
mediation" to refer to the mediation of litigation in a discrete, problem-solving manner.
They contrast this approach to their more favored "transformative" or relationshiporiented approach. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why
Transformative Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 368-69 (2001)
(distinguishing between "transactional model" [or problem-solving model] and
"transformative model," and reviewing literature on mediation). When I use the term
"transactional mediation," I am not referring to the mediator's style or approach but
instead to the substantive context in which the mediation takes place-the transactional
context as opposed to litigation.
18 See R. Day, On Markets in Economic Theory, 41 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 1
(2000) ("[Tlheorists and experimenters have largely neglected this important aspect of
the modem economy."); Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, Middlemen, 102 Q. J.
ECON. 581, 581 (1987) ("Despite the important role played by intermediation in most
markets, it is largely ignored by the standard theoretical literature."); Abdullah Yavas,
Search and Trading in Intermediated Markets, 5 J. ECON. & MGT. STRATEGY 195, 196
(1996) ("[T]he important role played by intermediaries in most markets has been largely
ignored until recently."). For an excellent overview of intermediation in various markets,
see Daniel F. Spulber, Market Microstructure and Intermediation, 10 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 135, 136-41 (1996).
19 This is the problem of the double coincidence of wants. See id. at 143. An
intermediary can sometimes add value by providing trading immediacy. See Rubinstein
& Wolinsky, supra note 18, at 581-82 ("What makes the middlemen's activity possible
is the time-consuming nature of the trade, which enables the middlemen to extract surplus
in return for shortening the time period that sellers and buyers have to wait for a
transaction."); Abdullah Yavas, The Immediacy Service of the Specialist as a
CoordinationMechanism, 10 INT'L. REV. ECON. & FIN. 205, 207 (2001) (showing that
the specialist-intermediary can provide an "immediacy service" given certain matching
costs).
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coordinate or match parties (e.g., travel agents, employment agencies, or the
multiple listing service in residential real estate). Alternatively, an
intermediary can buy and sell as a principal, hold inventory, and thereby
serve as a centralized and easily identifiable trading partner (e.g., the used car
dealer). 20 In markets with asymmetric information and the possibility of
"lemons," 2 ' a middleman who buys and sells goods can supply information
about, or independently guarantee, product quality (e.g., dealers in antiques
and fine art). 22 This Article seeks to enrich our understanding of commercial
transactions by focusing legal scholars on the role of a particular type of
intermediary-the third-party mediator.
I begin, in Part II, by reviewing the law and economics argument for
mediation in disputes. Assuming parties are rational and self-interested, how
can a mediator add value to their negotiations? I discuss two central ways in
which a mediator can help settle disputes: by helping parties to discover
whether settlement is possible and by helping parties to optimize their
settlement. I then apply these arguments to the transactional context. Part III
then considers behavioral justifications for transactional mediation. I relax
the rationality assumption of Part UI, and explore some of the psychological,
emotional, and relational barriers to agreement that can plague transactional
bargaining. Part IV then presents preliminary empirical evidence suggesting
that some transactional mediation already takes place. Finally, Part V uses
the theoretical apparatus developed in Parts II and II to explore the
implications of my argument.
20 See generally Abdullah Yavas, Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets, 12 J.
LAB. ECON. 406-(1994)-(discussing how middlemen function in markets); see Abdullah
Yavas, Search and Trading in Intermediated Markets, 5 J. ECON. & MGT. STRATEGY
195, 196-97 (1996) (analyzing the role of matchmakers and middlemen). Much of the
work on search theory originates with G.J. Stigler. G.J. Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213 (1961). For an overview of the literature, see Edward
A. Baryla & Leonard V. Zumpano, Buyer Search Duration in the Residential Real Estate
Market: The Role of the.Real Estate Agent, 10 J. REAL EST. RES. 1 (1995).
21 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing the now infamous "lemons
problem").
22 See Gary Biglaiser & James W. Friedman, Adverse Selection with Competitive
Inspection, 8 J. ECON. & MGT. STRATEGY, Spring 1999, at 1, 2 (modeling the role of
middlemen in inspecting quality of goods in a market with heterogeneous buyers and
sellers); Gary Biglaiser, Middlemen as Experts, 24 RAND J. EcON. 212, 212-13 (1993)
(arguing that a middleman capable of inspecting goods and establishing a reputation for
honesty reduces bargaining impasse); Yiting Li, Middlemen and Private Information, 42
J. MONETARY ECON. 131, 132 (1998) (modeling how middlemen arise to address adverse
selection and arguing that "[p]rivate information concerning the quality of goods may be
the driving force behind intermediation in several markets in the real world").
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IX. ECONOMIC OR STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRANSACTIONAL
MEDIATION

Some are skeptical of mediation. If one assumes that rational, selfinterested actors can generally bargain to efficient agreements, why involve a
third party? If a mediator has no authority to bind the parties to a given
outcome, then what does the mediator add-other than costs-that the parties
23
cannot do for themselves?
Given this basic uncertainty about how mediation creates value even in
disputes, suggesting that mediators might benefit transactionalnegotiations
may seem absurd. In short, the case must be made, and made strongly, that
transactional mediators could serve some useful function. In this Part, I first
explore the economic argument for mediation in disputes, focusing on the
ways in which a mediator can help rational parties to overcome information
asymmetries and strategic bargaining behavior. I then apply that argument to
the transactional context and explore whether it holds there. Although the
economic analysis in this Part is complex, I ultimately conclude that neutral
mediators do have an economic function to play in certain stages of
transactions.
A. Economic Justificationsfor Dispute Mediation
The economic case for mediation rests on the assumption that mediators
can help litigating parties overcome two types of bargaining failure. First, if
the parties behave strategically, they may fail to reach agreement even when
doing so would create gains from trade. Second, even if the parties reach a
settlement, they may settle for an economically inefficient agreement. This
section explores how a mediator can help to overcome both of these
problems.
1. Discovering Gainsfrom Trade
Theoretically, most cases should settle. Litigation is essentially a
transaction in which the plaintiff attempts to sell its legal claim to the
defendant. If the parties can agree on what the case is worth, they can settle
24
and save the transaction costs of litigating to judgment.
23 For an excellent overview of how mediators can add value, see RUSSELL
KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 345-56 (2002); see also HOWARD
RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE
DECISION MAKING 317-19 (2002) (discussing the role of a mediator).

24 See Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
29 (1995) (noting that settling saves litigation costs, so parties can divide surplus created
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Parties sometimes fail to settle cases when doing so would be mutually
beneficial, however. 25 Law and economics has offered various suggestions
for why this might happen. In the Priest and Klein model of why some cases
do not settle, bargaining failures occur when parties make inaccurate
predictions about the expected value of rejecting settlement and going to
court. 26 A plaintiff will demand no less than the plaintiffs estimate of the
expected judgment minus the plaintiffs transaction costs. A defendant will
offer no more than the defendant's estimate of the judgment plus transaction
costs. So long as their net estimates overlap, they will settle. But if
uncertainty is great about what a court will do or what the costs will be, the
parties may not find a mutually-satisfactory agreement. They may be unable
to agree on what the case is worth.
Parties may also fail to settle if they negotiate strategically to try to
capture greater gains for themselves. The parties may agree on case
valuation-thus eliminating Priest and Klein's problem-but fail to agree on
how to divide their transaction cost savings. 27 The plaintiff may make an
exaggerated demand, hoping to secure a more favorable settlement. The
defendant may counter with an unreasonably low offer, likewise hoping to
pressure the plaintiff to concede. If each holds firm, they may not be able to
settle.
Such strategic bargaining is possible because valuing litigation presents a
classic adverse selection problem.28 In valuing the plaintiffs legal
by not litigating); Shavell, supra note 12, at 11 (arguing that unless the difference
between the plaintiff's and defendant's expected judgments exceeds the sum of their trial
costs, the parties will settle to save such costs).
25 Not all cases should settle, of course. In some cases a party's interests can be best
served by getting his day in court or by refusing to back down on a matter of principle.
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 107 (discussing why some cases shouldn't settle).
26 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1984); see also Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric
Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451,
457-66, 471-74 (1998) (offering evidence in support of Priest and Klien's divergent
expectations theory).
27 See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of the Law, 19
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 487, 496 (1994) ("Rational choice offers no theory of the particular
proportions in which voluntary traders will divide a cooperative surplus.").
28 Adverse selection problems occur prior to a transaction when information
asymmetries permit a party who is likely to produce an adverse outcome to nevertheless
transact as if that party were not of the adverse type. For example, if insurance companies
cannot differentiate between healthy and unhealthy consumers, an unhealthy consumer
can pass itself off as a healthy one, thereby paying lower premiums. Moral hazard is the
problem created after a transaction, when a contract shifts risk from one party to another
and information asymmetries permit the non-riskbearer to behave adversely under the
contract without detection or consequence. Insurance again provides the classic example.
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entitlement or claim, the parties must determine its quality or merits. Each
side may have private information that bears on the claim's value, however,
and each has incentives to manipulate the other side's perception of that
30
value. 29 To do this, each side tries to keep private its true reservation price.
The defendant does not want the plaintiff to know how much the defendant
will spend, and the plaintiff does not want the defendant to know how little
the plaintiff will accept. Each therefore makes exaggerated offers or demands
to hide its true reservation price. 31 As they haggle, sometimes these strategic
32
maneuvers create deadlock and prevent settlement.
A mediator can mitigate strategic posturing and help disputing parties
discover whether settlement is possible. The mediator can do this by
managing the transfer of information. 3 3 Thomas Schelling recognized this
As soon as I am insured, I may drive more daringly, knowing that some of the costs of
my risk-taking will be borne by the insurance company. For an overview of adverse
selection and moral hazard problems, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic
Behavior, in 4 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J.

ARROW 136, 147-51 (1984).
29 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 111-12 (discussing litigants' attempts to
influence others' perceptions of case value).
30 A reservation price is the maximum that a buyer is willing to pay or the minimum
that a seller is willing to accept.
31 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationalesfor Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323, 339-40 (1994) (providing a model of how adverse selection sacrifices
gains from trade).
32 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 972-77 (1979) (discussing various
strategic behaviors and noting that parties may attempt to extract greater gains by
threatening to go to court even if the outcome is uncertain). A vast game theoretic
literature has now examined the strategic nature of bargaining. See, e.g., GAMETHEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985).
It is difficult to measure the incidence of strategic behavior in legal disputes. One
study of over 1,600 cases compared plaintiffs' initial demands to their attorneys' private
assessments (assessed through interviews) of case value. In 41% of tort cases, demands
were less than or equal to the lawyer's true estimate. At the same time, 14% of lawyers
reported demanding at least twice their true estimation of case value. And 37% of defense
lawyers reported that their lowest settlement offer was half or less of their true estimation
of case value. See Theodore Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication:
Kritzer on Brokers and Deals, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 275, 285 (1994) (citing HERBERT
M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN

ORDINARY LITIGATION 49 (1991)); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting
to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 319, 343-46 (1991) (describing that in 25% of studied personal injury cases, the
defendant's final offer is $0, which is by definition a strategic final offer because it fails
to account for the costs and fees a defendant will surely incur if the case is tried).
33 In the legal scholarship, Shavell is credited with the first fairly complete analysis
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role for mediators in his classic work on bargaining theory, and the argument
has been recently revived. 34 As Schelling explains:
A mediator can consummate certain communications while blocking off
certain facilities for memory. (In this regard he serves a function that can be
reproduced by a computing machine.) He can, for example, compare two
parties' offers to each other, declaring whether or not the offers are
compatible without revealing the actual offers. He is a scanning device that
can suppress part of the information put into it. He makes possible certain
limited comparisons that are beyond the mental powers of the participants,
35
since no player can persuasively commit himself to forget something.

of the economic benefits of nonbinding mediation. See Shavell, supra note 12, at 5-7
(exploring various types of benefits). Brown and Ayres further explored the ways in
which a nonbinding mediator can improve upon the outcomes of various common games.
See Brown & Ayres, supra note 31, at 393, 394 (finding that mediation can mitigate
adverse selection and moral hazard in various games, as well as create value by
mediating the flow of information between parties); see also Stephen J. Spurr, The Role
of Nonbinding Alternative Dispute Resolution in Litigation, 42 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
75, 76-77 (2000) (analyzing mediation program in which a panel of mediators evaluates
a legal claim and proposes a settlement figure); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986) (considering possibility that summary jury
trials promote convergence of beliefs and thereby promote settlement). In general, very
little research has been done on this topic. See ABHINAY MUTHOO, BARGAINING THEORY
WITH APPLICATIONS 338 (1999) (noting that "[t]he role of arbitrators and mediators on
the bargaining outcome is [an] area that needs much research").
34
See Avinash Dixit & Barry Nalebuff, Making Strategies Credible, in STRATEGY
AND CHOICE 161 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (discussing mediation as a
coordination mechanism); Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 120-21 (1995) (exploring how a mediator may serve as an
informational escrow to facilitate settlement and comparing mediation to settlement
escrows).
35 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 144-45 (1960); see also
DAVID A. LAx & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 172 (1986) ("By acting
as a selective conduit of information, a third party can reduce the expected or feared cost
of disclosing information.").
Schelling's comment that a mediator is akin to a computing machine is strangely
prescient. Various web sites now offer "mediation" services of exactly this type:
comparing offers and counteroffers and revealing settlement only if the parties' offers
overlap. See ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING

CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 61-63 (2001) (describing blind bidding systems); ALAN
SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 124-25,

337 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing these web services); Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online
Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential,Problems, and a Proposal,3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 175 (1998) (same).
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Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres have explained this intuition in more
formal terms. They suggest that sequential caucusing in mediation can help
to mitigate the effects of adverse selection. 36 First, a mediator can receive
confidential information from each side and determine independently
whether gains from trade exist. The presence of a mediator allows the parties
to make unobservable concessions. 37 Each side can signal willingness to
compromise without fear that their signal will go unreciprocated, because the
mediator will mute communications and only disclose information when the
parties' offers overlap. Brown and Ayres argue that if the mediator commits
38
in advance to breaking off negotiations if the parties' offers fail to overlap,
then the parties will have an incentive to represent their reservation prices
more accurately to the mediator than they might to each other face-to-face.
Put differently, the threat that a lack of overlap will end the bargaining
creates an incentive to be reasonable, which counters the strategic incentive
39
to misrepresent one's type as a high-value or low-value buyer or seller.
In addition, if the mediator commits to convey information imprecisely,
parties may disclose information to a mediator more accurately than they
would to each other. A party is unlikely to disclose her true reservation price
to the mediator if she believes that the mediator will then share that
information with her counterpart. But if the mediator commits credibly either
to add to or to distort that information, such as by telling the other side "Party
A is willing to pay something less than $X+20" rather than the more precise
"Party A is willing to pay $X," then the party may disclose truthfully to the
mediator. 40 Alternately, a mediator might try to find an acceptable agreement
by interviewing each side about possible concessions and then presenting
each side with several solutions, some of which one side or the other had
proposed, and some of which the mediator had created herself. If the
36 See Brown & Ayres, supra note 31, at 327-28.
37 For a similar formal analysis of mediators serving as a passive auctioneer who
compares offers and only announces when offers overlap, see Xavier Jarque et al.,
Mediation: Incomplete Information Bargaining with Filtered Communication (2000)
(working paper from Unitat de Fonaments de lAnalisi Econ6mica (UAB) and Institut
d'Anezlisi Econ6mica (CSIC), on file with author). See also Charles A. Wilson, Mediation

and the Nash BargainingSolution, 6 REV. ECON. DESIGN 353, 353-54 (2001) (analyzing

bargaining with a mediator who makes random proposals until agreement is reached).
38 Of course, it may be difficult for a mediator to commit credibly to terminate all

negotiations between the parties if there is no overlap. In the transactional context, the
mediator might have to take a hostage-such as a posted bond-from the parties, which
they would lose if they continued to negotiate after the mediation concluded. See Brown
& Ayres, supra note 31, at 354 (discussing using hostages for this purpose).

39 See id. at 335.
40 See id. at 358-59.
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mediator keeps the origin of each proposal confidential and merely tests for
acceptability, she could uncover an agreement without disclosing information
about either side's reservation price to the other. Again, with accurate
information about each side's valuation, the mediator may then be able to
signal that gains from trade exist. In this way, mediation may reduce the
costs of bargaining.
2. Optimizing Gainsfrom Trade

Sometimes in litigation, more for one party necessarily means less for the
other. In other cases, however, parties can trade on differences between their
resources, needs, and preferences to "create value" or reach Pareto-efficient
solutions. 4 1 Much bargaining scholarship is concerned with whether
negotiators reach such efficient agreements, why they might not, and how to
help them do so more frequently. 42 Information asymmetries are again the
culprit. To find trades, parties must share information about their needs and
preferences. But negotiators are often reluctant to do so. Empirical studies
show that negotiators both seek and provide far less information about each
others' interests and priorities than one might expect. 43 One common
explanation is that offering information freely makes you vulnerable: the
44
other side may use information about your priorities to extract concessions.
Parties may therefore withhold information, preventing the discovery of
value-creating trades.

41 An agreement is Pareto efficient if there is no other possible agreement that can
make one party better off without making another party worse off. See, e.g., RAIFFA,
supra note 15, at 156-64 (discussing Pareto-efficiency in negotiations).
42 See LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 35, at 88-116 (describing different sources of
value in transactions, including differences between the parties, similarities, and
economies of scale and scope); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 14-16 (same). For an
excellent overview of joint-gain opportunities in the transactional arena, see David A.
Lax & James K. Sebenius, Dealcrafting: The Substance of Three-Dimensional
Negotiations, NEGOT. J., Jan. 2002, at 5, 12-25.
43 See, e.g., Leigh L. Thompson, Information Exchange in Negotiation, 27 J. EXPER.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 177 (1991) ("[Tlhese findings suggest that information exchange is
difficult to elicit in negotiation and that negotiators may even resist or avoid information
exchange.").
44 See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 7276 (1992) (discussing obstacles to integrative negotiations); LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note
35, at 172 (noting that negotiators are "reluctant to reveal their preferences and beliefs
because they fear that such disclosures will be exploited"); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note
4, at 12-23 (discussing tension between creating and distributing value).
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A mediator can sometimes overcome this second bargaining problem by
helping parties to find efficient trades that they might otherwise overlook. 4 5
A divorcing couple, for example, can optimize their child visitation schedule
if they can discover that rather than following the custom of alternating
major holidays with the children, both would prefer the father to take the kids
for three weeks in the summer (when the mother likes to take long sailing
trips) in exchange for allowing the mother to have them for both
Thanksgiving and their winter vacation (when the father likes to ski). Each
might be reluctant to make this suggestion, however, for fear that it will
signal weakness or a willingness to compromise on visitation. A mediator
might be able to interview the mother and father privately and discover these
preferences. The mediator may thus identify or help the parties to identify
this value-creating alteration to the standard visitation schedule. 46 Similarly,
litigants can create value through structured payments that spread
compensation over time 47 ; a contingent agreement that overcomes different
expectations about future events 4 8; or creative provisions-such as an
49
apology-that trade on intangible interests otherwise difficult to discern.
Although strategic bargaining may often prevent exploiting such
opportunities to create value, a mediator's informational advantage may
discover them.
45 See, e.g., BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 208-09
(2000) (discussing ways in which a mediator can encourage creativity); LAX & SEBENIUS,
supra note 35, at 173 ("[B]ecause the mediator may know more about all the negotiator's
preferences and beliefs than any single person does, he may be able to suggest mutually
beneficial provisions that the others might not think possible."); CHRISTOPHER W.
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 250-61 (1996) (discussing procedures for generating
creative solutions in disputes).
46 See Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out if It's True: Comparing
Mediation and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 133, 137-38
(discussing that parties may disclose more information to a mediator than to each other
and that a mediator can use such information to come up with creative solutions).
47 See Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 69 n.225 (1985) (discussing structured settlements and
providing citations).
48 See Max H. Bazerman & James J. Gillespie, Betting on the Future: The Virtues of
Contingent Contracts, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 155, 156-60 (suggesting
contingent contracts as a means to resolve antitrust litigation against IBM in the 1980s
and against Microsoft in the 1990s); see also James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand
the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 69-71 (1997) (describing
ways in which bets might facilitate settlement).
49 On the role of apology in litigation and mediation, see Jonathan R. Cohen,
Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1036-39 (1999) (exploring the
complexities of apology and arguing that mediation allows parties to reach this
sometimes value-creating solution).
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B. Economic Justificationsfor TransactionalMediation
1. Discovering and Optimizing Gainsfrom Trade
Transactional negotiators theoretically face similar adverse selection
problems to those faced by disputing parties. First, the parties may not
discover that trade is possible. Just as a litigating defendant may posture and
bluff to try to low-ball a plaintiff, a buyer in a transaction may be tempted to
try to get a better deal by "looking cheap." In other words, even if a buyer is
willing to pay a high price, she may do better by looking as if she will only
pay a low one. The opposite is true of sellers. One common example from
the transactional context illustrates the problem. Because a high-value buyer
does not want to signal his type to the seller, and because a seller is likely to
equate having deep pockets with a willingness to spend, a deep-pocketed
buyer may seek to hide its identity to prevent giving away too much to the
seller. In this case an agent-such as an attorney-can be used to present an
anonymous offer, thereby eliminating any signal about reservation price that
might be inferred from the buyer's identity. 50 An agent cannot, however,
overcome the more basic adverse selection problem caused by the simple fact
that making any offer sends information about the offeror's previously
private reservation price. Information asymmetries may thus lead parties to
exaggerate offers and demands in order to get a better deal.
In one experiment, for example, small teams of experienced executives
were given detailed information about two simulated companies. They were
then assigned to represent one company or the other and asked to evaluate
the companies and negotiate a merger. Although agreement was possible,
only nine of the twenty-one pairings reached agreement. In addition, the
executives disagreed wildly about the relevant valuations-selling prices
ranged from $3.3 million to $16.5 million. 5 1 This suggests that occasionally
transacting parties fail to "close the deal" because of strategic posturing.
Second, as in litigation, transacting parties may fail to find Paretoefficient agreements. In an idealized situation with full information and zero
transaction costs, the parties should trade until they find an economically
efficient contract. 52 It is notoriously unclear, however, whether contracting
50 In a sense, the attorney in this example is serving as a mediator. See SCHELLING,
supra note 35, at 145 ("The use of mediators to forestall identification seems to be a
common tactic when a buyer of large resources thinks a painting or a right-of-way can be
bought cheap if the owner is unaware who it is that is interested.").
51 RAIFFA, supra note 15, at 94-95.
52 Under these assumptions, there is no reason for two parties to stop bargaining
until they have optimized their gains from trade. Given the choice between accepting
Solution A and continuing to bargain towards Solution B, which is better for one or both

CONTRACT FORMATION

parties reach Pareto-efficient agreements in practice. 53 Information
asymmetries and strategic posturing may again lead to inefficiencies. Two
parties may not discover an efficient agreement if one or the other is
reluctant to discuss it (or agreements of its type) for fear that doing so will
reveal private information about the party's reservation price.
An executive negotiating her employment agreement, for example,
might shy away from discussing certain packages that involve accepting a
lower salary in exchange for better benefits or greater stock options, if the
executive fears that doing so would send an unwise signal about her worth.
Similarly, an experiment in the corporate acquisitions context suggests that
even when experienced negotiators reach agreement, they do not
necessarily reach Pareto-efficient contracts. Even subjects trained in
decision analysis and finance succumbed to the strategic difficulties
inherent in bargaining and, because of a failure to share information,
54
sometimes concluded inefficient deals.
As in litigation, a mediator should be able to help. Interestingly, the
researcher in this corporate acquisitions experiment re-ran the simulation
offering each negotiating pair the service of a trained mediator, but not
requiring that they use the mediator. Those executives that made use of the

than A, rational negotiators should seek Solution B. The devil, of course, is in one's
assumptions.
53 See, e.g., John J. Donohue El, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to
Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 606 (1989) (reviewing empirical
evidence in employment bargaining context that questions basic Coasean assumptions).
54 RAIFFA, supra note 15, at 100-01 (describing an experiment with an acquisition
requiring contingent contracting). Asymmetric information models of strategic behavior
indicate that inefficiency is a common outcome. See Joseph Farrell, Information and the
Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at 113, 113; see also Robert Cooter, The
Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (noting that strategic behavior over
dividing the pie may inhibit Coasean bargaining); Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to
Nuisance Cases BargainAfter Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral,66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 373, 384 (1999) (suggesting that parties do not bargain after judgment, contrary to
the Coase theorem). Psychological research also indicates that subjects sometimes arrive
at "lose-lose" outcomes. See generally, Leigh Thompson & Dennis Hrebec, Lose-Lose
Agreements in Interdependent Decision Making, 120 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 396 (1996)
(reporting that lose-lose outcomes occurred 20% of the time in a study of over 5,000
subjects negotiating a simulation in which they had compatible preferences). Other
studies indicate the opposite. Some experimental studies show that parties generally reach
efficient outcomes, although they may not distribute the gains from trade evenly. See
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental
Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982); J. Keith Mumighan et al., The Information Dilemma in
Negotiations: Effects of Experience, Incentives, and Integrative Potential, 10 INTL. J.
CONFLICT MGT. 313, 331-32 (1999).
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mediator reached more efficient contracts than those that did not.55 Similarly,
Max Bazerman et al. found that a mediator intermediary-as opposed to an
agent--can lower impasse rates in transactional bargaining. 5 6 Although
experimental economics regarding the role of mediators and intermediaries is
in its infancy, 57 and some research suggests that intermediaries merely add
costs and thus preclude agreement in some bargaining, 58 there is at least
preliminary evidence that a transactional mediator can add value.
For example, as part of a larger project on fair division procedures,
Steven Brams and Alan Taylor note that a mediator should theoretically be
able to help merging companies resolve disagreements over "social issues,"
such as how to name the post-merger corporation, how to resolve status and
position questions (e.g., who will be CEO), and where to locate the new
company's headquarters. 59 After reviewing a sample of large mergers that
collapsed because of disputes over such issues, they concluded that "[tihese
deals highlight the need for effective dispute-resolution techniques in
merger negotiations." 60 Their "adjusted winner" procedure is designed to
reduce deal failure and optimize the efficiency of trades about these social
issues. 6 1 The parties assign points to the various issues in contention and a
mediator referee then uses their assignments to plumb for the most value62
creating solutions to their disagreements.

55 RAIFFA, supra note 15, at 102.
56 See Max H. Bazerman et al., The Effects ofAgents and Mediatorson Negotiation
Outcomes, 53 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 55, 64 (1992) (finding weak
support for the notion that mediators will lower impasse rates).
57 See Abdullah Yavas et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of
Intermediarieson the Outcome of Bargaining Games, 29 REAL ESTATE ECON. 251, 252
(2001) ("To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide an experimental analysis
of the role of brokers in bargaining games.").
58 See id. at 272 (concluding that a broker-intermediary merely reduces the
likelihood of successful negotiation and increases sale price, but focusing on agentintermediaries paid a percentage of sale price by the seller).
59 STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, THE WIN-WIN SOLUTION: GUARANTEEING

FAIR SHARES TO EVERYBODY 125-30 (1999).
60

Id.at 132.
61 See id. at 69-88 (describing the procedure).
62 Although parties may sometimes be able to make use of adjusted winner without
a referee, using a mediator permits the parties to avoid disclosing information to each
other about their relative preferences. Instead, the referee merely uses this information to
find trades, disclosing solutions to the parties but keeping. private the parties' underlying
priorities. See id. at 118 (discussing why a mediator might add value by keeping certain
information private).
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Howard Raiffa also suggests that a mediator might serve as a "contract
embellisher" in transactions. 63 He suggests that at the start of bargaining a
mediator could privately interview each party about its needs, priorities, and
perceptions. The mediator would lock away that information and the parties
would be left alone to negotiate a deal. At the conclusion of their
negotiation, but prior to closing the deal, the intervenor would return. After
examining the terms of the parties' agreement, the intervenor would try to
use his private information about the parties' interests to craft a superior
deal. He would then show his substitute agreement to each party privately.
If both sides agreed that the mediator's suggestion was superior to their own
contract, the substitution would be made. There would be no haggling about
the terms of the mediator's proposal-it would be a take-it-or-leave-it
situation.
It is difficult to know whether Raiffa's intervenor would succeed in
practice. 64 Nevertheless, the role is certainly plausible. A skilled mediator
might find trades or packages that the parties had overlooked because of
carelessness, time pressures, limited skills or experience, or strategic
posturing.

63 See RAIFFA, supra note 15, at 221; see also Max H. Bazerman et al., PostSettlement Settlements in Two-Party Negotiations, 3 NEGOT. J. 283 (1987); Robert W.
Mendenhall, Post-Settlement Settlements: Agreeing to Make Resolutions Efficient, 1996
J. DisP. RESOL. 81 (reviewing the concept of post-settlement settlement and offering
critique); Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, 1 NEGOT. J. 9 (1985) (describing
the same role).
64 This second stage might create incentives to behave opportunistically in the initial
face-to-face negotiations. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 35, at 180-81 (discussing
Raiffa's proposal); Orley Ashenfelter et al., An Experimental Comparison of Dispute
Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems, 60 EcONOMETRICA 1407, 1416-19 (1992)
(suggesting that bargainers have more difficulty reaching agreement on their own if they
know that an arbitrator will be available later). It seems unlikely, however, that any
exacerbation would be severe. See David W. Grigsby & William J. Bigoness, Effects of
Mediation and Alternative Forms of Arbitration on Bargaining Behavior: A Laboratory
Study, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 549, 552-53 (1982) (finding that bargainers anticipating
mediation after dyadic negotiation were just as cooperative as those not anticipating
mediation, although the result may be attributable to a later arbitration stage). The second
stage merely optimizes upon the first. A negotiator in this scheme would know, just as he
knows without Raiffa's optimizer in place, that self-interested attempts to claim value run
the risk of shrinking the pie and thus leading to a worse result, even from the selfinterested point of view. Of course, there is no guarantee that Raiffa's optimizer will be
able to cure any such bargaining failure.
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2. Litigation Settlements and BilateralMonopoly
So far I have suggested that transactional negotiators face the same
economic or informational barriers to agreement faced by disputing
negotiators and that a mediator may thus be as valuable in the transactional
arena. Although this basic case for transactional mediation is sound, it is
overly simple. To deepen this initial analysis of how transactional mediators
might dampen strategic behavior by controlling information exchange, we
must examine under what market conditions the argument that "mediators
add value by mitigating adverse selection" will hold.
Contracting takes place in a spectrum of market conditions. At one end
of the spectrum lie classical contracts in well-oiled markets with large
numbers competition, such as commodities markets. Each contract is discrete
and there is good reason to believe that the market can price efficiently. At
the other end of the spectrum, parties bargain under bilateral monopoly
conditions. In a bilateral monopoly, there is only one seller and only one
buyer. In other words, there is no market to establish a market price. There
are no external bargaining alternatives that will drive the price towards the
seller's marginal cost (or reservation price). Instead, the valuation task is
highly interdependent: buyer and seller must make offers and demands based
on how much they know about the other's reservation price. The seller wants
to demand as much as possible given what she knows about the buyer's
reservation price, and the buyer wants to offer as little as possible given what
he knows about the seller's reservation price. The consequence is pricing
indeterminacy. Economic theory cannot determine the outcome of bilateral
monopoly bargaining. Instead, the outcome of bilateral monopoly bargaining
depends on the negotiators' ability to wield bargaining power 65 and invoke
66
procedural and substantive norms of bargaining to their advantage.
In a competitive market, by contrast, the buyer's subjective valuation is
not particularly significant to the seller's pricing decision. Although the seller
might find a buyer willing to transact at above market price, the seller knows
that actually setting the sale price above market is unlikely to succeed
because of the presence of alternate sellers willing to undercut such a
decision and price at marginal cost. Put differently, a competitive market will
discipline negotiators to bargain reasonably. As Oliver Williamson put it:
Opportunistic inclinations by themselves... are not sufficient for an
opportunism problem to be posed. It is further necessary to stipulate that a
65 In general, "bargaining power" refers to the ability to impose costs on the other
party and to absorb costs imposed by the other.
66 See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789,
1817-31 (2000) (describing the importance of power and norms).
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small numbers bargaining condition prevails. In circumstances where, both
presently and prospectively, a large number of well-qualified, noncollusive
bidders exist, competition will obtain and only fair returns will be realized.
Where, however, such parity conditions break down, the self-policing
benefits of competition are no longer assured and concern with opportunism
67
is accordingly warranted.
Settlement negotiations in litigation take place under bilateral monopoly
conditions. 68 There is no market for the plaintiff's legal claim. Either the
defendant will buy it or it will go unsold. 69 Although going to court is
commonly referred to as the litigants' best "alternative," 70 it is not an
alternative in the market or economic sense. The court serves merely as a
valuation mechanism to price the litigants' transaction, not as an alternate
buyer for the plaintiff's cause of action. Looking at disputes through this lens
explains the presence of strategic behavior, and the use of mediation services,
in litigation. If mediators assist parties by reducing the impact of strategic
behavior and adverse selection, and if such problems are likely to be
particularly exacerbated in bilateral monopoly conditions, 7' it is not
67 Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The
Analysis of IdiosyncraticExchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 259 (1975); see also Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233, 249 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics]
("Market alternatives are mainly what protect each party against opportunism by his
opposite.").
68 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 68, 608 (5th ed. 1998)
(describing lawsuits as bilateral monopoly).
69 For an intriguing analysis suggesting that the strategic opportunism caused by the
nature of disputes as bilateral monopolies might be eliminated by allowing the sale of
litigation, see Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigationfor Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1529, 153738 (1996) ("The ability to sell claims destroys this bilateral monopoly and cures the
holdout problem.").
70 See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 100 (2d ed. 1991) (defining the term
"BATNA" or best alternative to a negotiated agreement).
71 I do not want to suggest that parties will always fail to reach agreement when
bargaining in bilateral monopoly conditions, nor that such agreements will always be
inefficient. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase suggests that even parties in a bilateral
monopoly will arrive at an efficient transaction. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). The suggestion is merely implicit, however, arising
from his use of several bilateral monopoly examples to illustrate his conclusion that as
long as the market works, allocation of legal entitlements is a wash. But-and here I
know that I am attempting to sidestep a hornet's nest-I tend to think that Coase does not
solve the problem of bilateral monopoly as much as he assumes it away. Coase
acknowledges the possibility of strategic behavior in a bilateral monopoly, but ultimately
assumes that "such manoeuvres are preliminaries to an agreement and do not affect the
long-run equilibrium position." Id. at 8. For critique of this assumption, see Donald H.
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surprising that these services have arisen in the litigation context. 72 Because
parties in a bilateral monopoly situation like litigation are likely to
experience bargaining failures, mediation and other mediator services have
evolved to address such inefficiencies.
3. TransactionalBargainingand BilateralMonopoly
This analysis seems to have taken us back to where we started.
Dealmaking generally takes place in competitive markets: if I cannot do the
deal with you, I can do it with someone else. This suggests that there should
be little for a mediator to do in contract bargaining. Unlike in settlement
negotiations, the market should mitigate adverse selection problems,
eliminating this justification for mediator intervention.
This market argument is certainly powerful, and it suggests that the
economic justification for mediators may be less applicable in transactions
than in disputes, but does it completely eliminate the possibility that
mediators could help contracting parties discover whether trade is possible or
find Pareto-efficient agreements? Is it really accurate to describe
transactional negotiations as fully collaborative information-sharing
experiences devoid of strategic posturing?
I think not. To understand where this market argument overstates its
case, one needs to look more closely at contract formation in complex deals.
In this section, I argue that a complex deal often takes on bilateral monopoly
characteristics at certain stages of the deal's life cycle. I contend that adverse
Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcON. 427, 428 (1972); see
generally Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(1987) (reviewing the literature and criticizing Coase's assumptions). And although some
continue to argue that negotiators will arrive at efficient agreements even in bilateral
monopoly conditions, "more have argued that bilateral monopoly markets are inherently
inefficient and prone to produce much bargaining and failed transactions." Herbert
Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 307 (1992)
(reviewing literature). But see Charles W.L. Hill, Cooperation, Opportunism, and the
Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory, 15 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV.
500, 509 (1990) (arguing that opportunistic players will be forced out of the market over
time); Richard D. Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 873, 900-11 (arguing that bilateral monopolists will arrive at Pareto optimal
agreements regarding quantity and price).
72 Transaction cost economics predicts that bilateral monopoly markets will adopt

governance structures to regulate bargaining. This is one explanation for the evolution of
adjudication and the court system. See Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra
note 67, at 250-52; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, in 4
THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW

136, 148

(1984) (suggesting that "economic institutions may compensate [for adverse selection] by
introducing nonmarket informational devices").
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selection problems may arise at any of four stages of a transactionmatching, pricing, closing, and renegotiation-but that they are likely to
increase in intensity as a transaction progresses towards closing and
renegotiation. In particular, I argue that closing stage negotiations over the
legal terms and conditions of a transaction-the stage at which transactional
lawyers are likely to be most involved-take on quasi-bilateral monopoly
conditions, making mediator intervention particularly attractive in that stage.
Before using these stages to explore the roles that mediators can play in
deals, a caveat is in order. These stages are not perfectly distinct, and their
importance differs deal-to-deal and context-to-context. I do not pretend-nor
need to claim for the argument here-that all deals progress uniformly
through these phases. They do not. Negotiations in a residential real estate
transaction may focus more on the pricing stage and less on closing, because
convention and statute may limit the need for tailoring legal language to shift
risk during the closing stage. Conversely, a merger negotiation may involve
extended closing negotiations even though pricing occurred relatively
quickly. The utility of this breakdown derives from its ability to illuminate
what is common among most transactions: that transactional negotiations
tend to move through similar issues in sequence; that agents play different
roles in deals during these different phases; and, ultimately, that
opportunities for mediator intervention may vary over the life cycle of a
transaction.
a. Matching
In the matching stage of a deal, a buyer and seller must find each other.
The transaction costs in question are search costs: the costs associated with
identifying a suitable trading partner. Although contracting parties often find
each other on their own, in markets with high search costs, various agentssometimes called "finders"-may serve as matchmakers. Given the
availability of such agents, for our purposes the question is whether a
mediator can add value in matching.
Finders are active in the matching process in many transactional
contexts, including residential and commercial real estate, small business
transactions, mergers and acquisitions, securities offerings, and other types of
deals. Headhunters, for example, trade on information in employment
markets. In residential real estate, real estate agents match buyers and sellers
with the aid of the multiple listing service (MLS). The MLS reduces search
costs by allowing agents to conduct multi-variable property searches tailored
to a buyer's preferences. In commercial real estate, the absence of an MLStype system necessitates dedicated finders to bring parties together.
Similarly, in mergers and acquisitions, investment banks, M&A departments
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of commercial banks, and merger consultants often introduce buyers and
74
sellers. 7 3 Lawyers also sometimes play this role.
Would a mediator offer advantages over such a finder? In most cases,
probably not. At this stage there are unlikely to be difficult adverse selection
problems for a mediator to resolve. The matching agent adds value by
investing in information about the market-knowing where to find suitable
homes or businesses for sale, for example. To make use of this service,
neither buyer nor seller need reveal sensitive information or fear that
information asymmetries will lead to strategic exploitation. Given the
likelihood of large numbers competition, there is little incentive to behave
strategically. A buyer who wants to purchase a home has no reason to
pretend otherwise, although she may want to hide how much she desires the
property. But in general matching only requires disclosing the basic interest
to purchase, not its extent (or, put differently, not one's reservation price). As
a result, at this stage there are few adverse selection problems for a mediator
to help parties overcome. Agents can fill the need for matchmakers.
There are, however, some circumstances in which a mediator might add
value in the matching stage. Some transactions require that parties share
confidential information to determine whether a match is possible. For
example, two pharmaceutical companies considering a joint venture may
need to exchange formulas, products, and strategic plans to see if a deal
makes sense. The parties may fear disclosing too much, however, because if
no deal is consummated they may have provided valuable information to a
competitor. Although parties can protect against the misuse of such
information through both contract and tort, 75 such controls may be imperfect.
A negotiating party may fear that ex post it will be difficult to enforce a
confidentiality provision quickly and completely enough to prevent the
party's information from becoming public.
Simultaneously, the other party may fear exposing itself to litigation if it
begins negotiations with a counterpart claiming to have private information.
73 See Alan K. Wells, Acquisition Intermediaries: Purveyors of Opportunity, in
DIRECTORY OF M&A INTERMEDIARIES 13, 14 (2001) ("The act of introducing or causing
the introduction of a buyer and seller is probably the most important function the
intermediary performs.").
74 See Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74
OR. L. REV. 239, 247-48 (1995) (discussing lawyers playing a matching role in venture
capital deals).
75 Although parties can contract to protect confidences, many may fail to do so. See
G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts:
Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 236 (1991). In tort, parties can
turn to the tort for misappropriation of trade secrets, which has been applied to the
precontractual bargaining process. See id. at 237-38.
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Some markets, for example, have seen opportunistic inventors flooding
manufacturers with vague descriptions of new gadgets for the sole purpose of
getting a foot in the door on a future suit for misappropriation of trade
secrets. 76 In such circumstances, a manufacturer may legitimately fear
talking with potential partners, unsure of whether such negotiations will
expose the manufacturer to liability.
A mediator could help parties in these circumstances. 77 By comparing
information, the mediator could determine whether a deal is possible or
whether further discussions would be worthwhile. As long as the parties trust
that the mediator can and will keep such information confidential, 78 and so
long as the mediator is sufficiently expert to render an opinion on the
viability of a deal, the parties might use a mediator to overcome these
matching stage strategic difficulties.
b. Pricing
After finding each other, the parties must set a basic deal price. This
often takes place through direct negotiation by the principals. Can a mediator
add value in pricing?
Some transactional contexts are true bilateral monopolies. In such deals,
pricing may become strategic, as each side tries to conceal its reservation
price to negotiate for a better deal. As in litigation, mediator services have
arisen to help transacting parties deal with strategic problems in some
bilateral monopoly bargaining. Collective bargaining is a common example
of bilateral monopoly contracting-the presence of a union serves to limit the
76 See id. at 238-39.
77 I can think of one other circumstance in which a mediator might have advantages
over an agent in the matching process: dating. There an available single might fear even
initiating "negotiations" with a blind date and thus might seek help in screening potential
dates for suitability. The single might not trust that a partisan agent, such as a friend, will
be able accurately to assess suitability, however, and may also distrust an agent and fear
that the agent will engage in over-matching (e.g., the proverbial parent who tries to fix
the single up with every available date in town). As a result, the single might find greater
benefit in a mediator dating service than in a partisan agent. The mediator service might
be able to screen potential candidates, always threatening to remove deceptive candidates
from the mediator's pool of singles. In this way the mediator might uncover more
accurate information than a partisan agent could on behalf of a single. In other words, the
mediator could create value by verifying type or identity. This would occur only in
heterogeneous markets in which party identity matters. In most markets with large
numbers competition and market homogeneity, however, a mediator is unlikely to have
much advantage over an agent.
78 See infra Part IV for discussion of the confidentiality and privilege problems in
the transactional context.
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employer's market alternatives-and mediators often assist in this domain.
Similarly, the sale of an Internet domain name is a modern bilateral
monopoly transaction prone to strategic bargaining. Again, mediation and
arbitration are used to overcome these strategic problems. 80
Although to date we have had no evidence as such-an empirical gap
that I begin to remedy in Part IV--one would certainly hypothesize that we
should expect to see mediators assisting in any true bilateral monopoly
transaction. For example, as one family member tries to sell its shares in the
family's privately-held company to a sibling, the negotiations may deadlock
quickly over the appropriate price. 8 1 Likewise, a landowner of a landlocked
parcel may find it difficult to bargain with his neighbor for an easement
granting access to the landowner's property. 82 The presence of only one
seller and only one buyer may tempt either party to hold out in order to
extract concessions from the other. Similarly, some intellectual property
negotiations present a bilateral monopoly bargaining problem. For example,
negotiations between a patentee of a partial genomic sequence and the
patentee of the complementary sequence may become adversarial. The
patents themselves may provide the transacting parties with all relevant
information about their respective inventions, essentially eliminating
information asymmetries about everything other than reservation price. Even
with full information and obvious gains from trade, however, the parties do
not always reach a deal. As Rochelle Dreyfuss explains, "[o]ften there is no
agreement at all, or the agreement is much delayed. In the case of patents, it
83
is sometimes so far into the patent term that significant value is dissipated.
In other words, because they are tempted to hold out for greater concessions,

79 The Department of Labor estimates that 96% of collective bargaining agreements
include a dispute resolution clause. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF
MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 112 (1981).
80 See Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal
Auctions, 2001U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 215-16 (discussing domain name disputes as bilateral
monopoly, describing current ADR procedures in this context, and proposing auction

mechanism to produce efficient outcomes).
81 See Howard Raiffa, The Neutral Analyst: Helping Parties to Reach Better
Solutions, in NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN 14, 19 (Lavinia Hall ed.,
1993) (describing this example and explaining how Raiffa served as a mediator to aid the
transacting parties).
82 See Sterk, supra note 71, at 76-77 (discussing this problem).
83 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Games Economists Play, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1821,
1828 (2000); see also Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659 (1994) (noting that valuation problems permit
strategic bargaining).
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the parties either fail to discover that gains from trade are possible, or they
84
may reach a Pareto-suboptimal deal.
In addition to such bilateral monopolies, one would expect to see
strategic bargaining-and the potential for mediator intervention-in pricing
transactions in any sort of thin market. The sale of an idiosyncratic good may
become strategic if there is a limited pool of potential buyers. For example, a
large pharmaceutical company that manufactures a unique product may need
the services of a specific biotech firm to improve the drug's capabilities.
With only one potential service provider and limited demand for the
biotech's capabilities, the parties may face quasi-bilateral monopoly
conditions. Some employment contract negotiations-such as for sports
stars, entertainers, or even a CEO or manager with specialized experiencemay take on bilateral-monopoly conditions if few firms have demand for the
potential employee's special skills and, simultaneously, few skilled persons
are available in the market. Finally, transactions with a federal, state or local
government can also take on bilateral monopoly conditions. For example, the
owner of a shopping mall complex may need to negotiate terms and
conditions with a city government to revitalize the area. Each side is locked
into doing a deal with the other.
That a mediator could assist in pricing deals in thin markets, however,
does not mean that a mediator can always add value in pricing by
overcoming asymmetric information about reservation price. As discussed
above, theoretically parties should not price strategically in competitive
markets (although some will inevitably try). Instead, the market will price
transactions efficiently without assistance. Whether a consumer is buying
new shoes at a retail shop or two CEOs are pricing a merger or the sale of a
corporate division, the presence of market alternatives should dampen
strategic behavior in pricing a deal. As a general hypothesis, we should not
expect to see severe posturing about reservation price in well-oiled markets.
Thus, one of the central justifications for using mediators in litigation-to
84 Various doctrines mitigate the effects of such conditions. Property law, for
example, permits a landlocked owner to force an easement by necessity on a stubborn
neighbor, essentially allocating the property right to the higher-value party to avoid the
social costs of strategic deadlock. See Sterk, supra note 71, at 76-78 (analyzing this
doctrine as a solution to bilateral monopoly problems). Per Williamson's insight that
institutional structures will be needed in bilateral monopoly situations, the easement by
necessity doctrine makes use of the court system to price a transaction that might
otherwise fail to take place. Intellectual property doctrine reaches the same result with
compulsory licensing rules. The compulsory licensing rules break the potential deadlock
by permitting the subsequent innovator to force a transaction. See Steven Shavell &
Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights 23 n.34 (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/246.pdf) (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
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overcome information asymmetries and their attendant adverse selection
problems-translates only partially to the transactional arena. If faced with
bilateral monopoly conditions, a mediator may add value in pricing.
Otherwise, the parties can price directly or through agents.
c. Closing
This analysis demonstrates that mediators could play a role, albeit
somewhat limited, in matching and pricing transactions. Certain transactions
are essentially just disputes in sheep's clothing: contracts are negotiated
under the same conditions that make disputes so difficult to settle. This
section argues that the closing stage legal negotiations of many deals face
such conditions as well, making mediator intervention more valuable in this
period of a complex transaction.
Negotiations during the closing stage focus on the contract's terms and
conditions. In a merger or acquisition, for example, a preliminary price has
likely already been set. The parties now attempt to confirm the quality of the
assets to be transferred. The buyer may conduct due diligence and the parties
bargain over inspection contingencies and discovered information about asset
value. The buyer may try to use such contingencies to exit the deal,
sometimes for strategic or economic reasons, or the parties may re-negotiate
the closing price to reflect new information.
In complex transactions, lawyers, accountants, bankers, and other agents
are generally brought in to assist in the closing stage. 85 Lawyers in particular
are needed to draft legal language for an acquisition agreement or other
contract. As the closing stage progresses, due diligence may not eliminate all
uncertainties about the company or assets in question. Lawyers will therefore
bargain over contract language to shift the risks associated with these
remaining uncertainties.
One might expect these legal negotiations during closing to be fairly
collaborative. As Ronald Gilson has explained, at least in theory, the parties
to a transaction have good reason to share information openly. 8 6 In an
85 In the merger context, brokers are very common. One study of mergers conducted
between January 1995 and June 2000 found that of 4,845 completed deals, only 790 (or
16%) were conducted in-house without advisors. See William C. Hunter & Julapa
Jagtiani, MergerAdvisory Fees and Advisors' Effort, in EMERGING ISSUES, at 5 (Fed. Res.
Bank of Chi., Emerging Issue Series 2000), available at http://www.chicagofed.
org/publications/publicpolicystudies/emergingissues/pdf/S&R-2000-11R.pdf (last visited
Jan. 27, 2004).
86 See Gilson, supra note 5, at 270 ("There is... an incentive for the parties to
cooperate both to reduce informational asymmetries between them and to reduce the
).
costs of acquiring information ....
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acquisition, for example, the target has little incentive to withhold
information from the acquirer about the condition of the target company. If it
does so, the acquirer will likely assume that the target's information is
problematic for the target, and thus the acquirer will either exit or alter the
transaction price if the information cannot be acquired elsewhere. 87 The
target, therefore, wants to cooperate in educating the acquirer. The question
is how to do so at the least cost, because the target knows that transaction
costs incurred during the negotiations will reduce the surplus available for
division between the parties.
If accurate, this description suggests that private incentives should
already lead transacting parties to disclose information freely-obviating the
need for a transactional mediator during closing. But Gilson acknowledges
that his description of information exchange as an open and cooperative
venture is at odds with the reality that business lawyers often do not
cooperate in exchanging information. As he states, "[w]hat remains
puzzling... is the apparent failure by both business lawyers and clients to
recognize that the negotiation of representations and warranties ...presents
the occasion for cooperative rather than distributive bargaining." 8 8 Myriad
disagreements arise during transactional legal negotiations-about whether
obligations in a preliminary agreement have been met, whether certain
contingency-triggering events have occurred, or the allocation of risks
regarding latent defects-and often lawyers bargain hard about them.
Gilson's puzzle is at least partially solved, however, if we remove the
assumption that closing stage negotiations over terms and conditions take
place under competitive market conditions with robust exit options. To the
extent that a deal has taken on quasi-bilateral monopoly conditions by the
time lawyers are called in-or, put differently, to the extent that those
involved in closing stage negotiations feel bound to do the deal-the
opportunity for strategic posturing arises.
This may occur for one of several reasons. First, as negotiations progress,
the parties bind themselves through increasingly restrictive contractual
commitments. A letter of intent, for example, may contain a no-shop
87 Similarly, Shavell and others have argued that litigants have good reasons to share
information with each other. See Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to
Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. EcON. 183, 184 (1989). To the extent that a party
has private information that bears on case value, failure to disclose that information
readily will signal that the information accrues to the benefit of the other side.
Nondisclosure thus merely creates incentives for the other side to compel the information
through discovery. See Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J.LEGAL
STUD. 29, 33 (1995) (explaining that a party "can infer from the [other's] silence that he
should demand the information").
88 Gilson, supra note 5, at 272.

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 19:2 2004]

agreement restricting the seller's ability to find alternate buyers, but it will
likely contain various ways that one or both parties could exit the deal.
During the closing stage, however, the parties restrict these exit options. As
exit options disappear through tightening of contractual commitments,
neither party believes that they can exit, or at least exit without incurring
significant costs.
In particular, transacting parties may fear that exit will give rise to
litigation. Although contract doctrine traditionally limited any cause of action
for pre-acceptance reliance, courts have infamously loosened these
constraints over time. 89 Transacting parties may thus be uncertain about
whether their preliminary commitments to each other have given rise to
liability. More important, perhaps, parties will often be uncertain about the
risk of liability because of the inherent possibility that a court will
misunderstand their contractual arrangements and find binding obligations
when none were intended.
Second, what may have been a competitive market in the pricing stagewhen one or both parties could have looked to the market for an alternate
trading partner-may take on quasi-bilateral monopoly conditions if a seller
is pessimistic about the likelihood of finding more than one buyer (or vice
versa), or if sufficiently high search and switching costs prevent going to an
alternate buyer after negotiations have begun with the first buyer found.
Some models suggest that even relatively small switching costs can prevent
changing trading partners. 90 As a recent economic analysis noted, the
presence of switching costs may "make a large finite market essentially
identical to bilateral monopoly." 9 1 And as one practitioner has explained,
"[t]he parties, particularly if they are part of large organizations, become
emotionally and, more importantly, bureaucratically committed to getting the
deal done. After announcing the execution of the letter of intent, neither party
'92
wants to be the one to walk without a very good reason."
Third, given that the principals may have already made public
announcements to the market about the transaction-or may have posted
89 Compare James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933)
(finding no pre-acceptance reliance) with Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal.
1958) (permitting cause of action for pre-acceptance reliance).
90 For a formal analysis of this problem, see Gianni de Fraja & Abhinay Muthoo,
EquilibriumPartnerSwitching in a BargainingModel with Asymmetric Information, 41

INT'L. ECON. REV. 849, 860 (2000) (presenting formal analysis of switching cost

problem). If a seller is sufficiently pessimistic, "the outside option is useless,"
transforming the market into what these authors call a "natural bilateral monopoly." Id.
91 Id. at

861.

92 See STANLEY FOSTER REED & ALEXANDRA REED LAjoux, THE ART OF M&A: A
MERGER ACQUISITION BUYOUT GUIDE 448 (3d ed. 1999).
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some other sort of bond making exit expensive 9 3-the lawyers, accountants,
and other agents trying to close the deal may not adequately consider "going
to the market" rather than reaching agreement. Such announcements may
have both intangible psychological effects-committing one or both sides
(and their constituents and stakeholders) to the deal-and more tangible
effects. An M&A announcement, for example, will already have inflated (or
deflated) stock prices by the time closing stage legal negotiations take place.
Those involved in this stage of the deal may thus be reluctant to consider
exit.
Fourth, as mentioned above, lawyers and other agents are often the
primary negotiators in the closing stage of a deal. A certain type of agency
costs may thus make it more difficult for a lawyer to choose to exit. If the
principals are largely absent during the legal negotiations in closing, the
lawyers may not have the authority to threaten to "walk." The common
separation between "legal issues" and "business issues" in a deal may work
to the lawyer's disadvantage-the lawyer may not really know the market
situation and whether there is a viable alternative to doing the deal with this
particular counterpart. 9 4 This may lead lawyers negotiating terms and
conditions to behave as if there is no viable exit alternative, meaning that
they bargain in the absence of a market to constrain strategic behavior.
Fifth, the "goods" to be traded by lawyers during the closing stage are
often idiosyncratic. Lawyers in a merger or acquisition may bargain over the
allocation of risks regarding future lawsuits against a target company for
environmental contamination or personal injury caused by one of the
company's products. However, there may be no market for these risks-and
thus no established market price. 9 5 As a result, in designing contract
mechanisms to trade on these risks, the lawyers may engage in hard
bargaining tactics, just as in litigation.
93 By posting a bond at the start of the transaction-such as a deposit in a residential

real estate transaction or an announcement to the public in a corporate transaction (which
can serve as a reputational bond)-the parties shift the negotiation towards bilateral
monopoly conditions.
94 This can manifest in another way as well. The commitments made during the
pricing stage can make the closing stage negotiation over representations and warranties a
distributive problem because concessions on legal language often are not compensated
for with changes to the deal price. See Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the
Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law &
Economics Literature,74 OR. L. REV. 189, 195 (1995) (agreeing with Gilson that many

representations and warranties serve to reduce transaction costs, but noting the lawyers
work in the shadow of a fixed deal price).
95 In some cases insurance may be available to cover the risks, but often the risks
may be so vague or amorphous that the lawyers may not be able to find good market
information on how to price the risks.
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These various explanations for strategic behavior in the closing stage of a
deal help to explain Gilson's observation that, in practice, transactional
negotiations over representations and warranties are often adversarial.
Although a given transaction may occur in an active market with alternate
buyers or sellers, certain periods of the negotiation may resemble bilateral
monopoly conditions. Both buyer and seller are--or feel-bound together.
As negotiations progress through the closing stage, they may thus become
increasingly strategic and hostile.96
I do not want to overstate this possibility. In many transactions, both
sides continue to seek or consider alternate trading partners, and the market
may thus constrain opportunism. 97 In addition, norms 98 and reputations9 9
may constrain strategic behavior during closing negotiations. Nevertheless,
this analysis suggests that mediator intervention might be helpful during the
closing stage, particularly vis-A-vis the drafting of a deal's legal
documentation. This, in turn, suggests a special role for lawyer-mediators in
transactions, as they may be best able to assist parties with the legal aspects
of closing.
A lawyer-mediator might prevent the parties' lawyers from blowing up
the deal unnecessarily, and, perhaps more importantly, from reaching an
inefficient set of contract terms. As lawyers and clients allocate legal risks
96 This seems to be in accord with the realities of transactional practice. Lawyers
bemoan "eleventh hour" closing tactics, common at the end of the deal.
97 As James Freund has noted,
[i]n deal-making, if negotiations prove unsuccessful, one or both parties can simply
walk away from the table .... As a result, unless your leverage happens to be
awesome, you can't take too unreasonable a position on a deal you want to see
happen-and you can't 'stick' with impunity on anything less than a genuine dealbreaker.
JAMES C. FREUND, THE NEUTRAL NEGOTIATOR: WHY AND How MEDIATION CAN WORK
TO RESOLVE DOLLAR DISPUTES 7 (1994).

98 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable
EmpiricalBasis ofArticle 2's IncorporationStrategy: A PreliminaryStudy, 66 U. Ci. L.
REV. 710, 717 (1999) (arguing that weakform norms related to cooperation exist in
certain industries and exploring the role of norms in contracting). For a recent empirical
examination of the power of relational norms in negotiation, see Jared R. Curhan et al.,
The 0. Henry Effect: Relational Norms and Negotiation (2002) (working paper, on file
with author) (describing two studies on the role of relational norms and concluding that
"in real world contexts, negotiators occasionally forfeit instrumental outcomes,
consciously or unconsciously, in deference to the pursuit of relational goals and/or the
adherence to relational norms").
99 Reputation is very important in contracting. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Conflict
and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2032 (1987)
("Contracting parties have an incentive.., to develop a reputation that both encourages
mutually beneficial cooperation and deters exploitation.").
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and opportunities, possibilities for gains from trade arise because of
differences in the parties' preferences and relative valuations. Although the
bargaining about a single contract term may be largely distributive-I want a
more restrictive allocation of responsibility for an environmental clean up,
you want a more expansive term-contracting attorneys can generally create
value by trading between terms. 100 For example, if a contract contains ten
legal provisions (A, B .... J), parties X and Y will value those terms
differently. If X finds term A extremely important and Y term B, they can
create joint gains by allocating the risk in term A as X prefers and the risk in
term B as Y prefers. And so on.
If transacting lawyers shared information openly, they would find such
trades (at least to the extent that doing so was justified in light of the
transaction costs incurred through the additional bargaining that would be
required). As a result, one would expect to see highly tailored contractual
provisions in complex deals-tailored terms would reflect these tailored
trades.
Empirical analysis of contracts, however, shows that parties often do not
trade risk in complex-yet value-creating-ways. Instead, in many domains
contracts are simpler than one might expect. 10 1 Various explanations have
been offered for this simplicity, including behavioral explanations 10 2 and the
network effects theory. 10 3 Another, less explored, explanation is that the
100 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 145.
101 See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why

Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91, 94-97 (2000) (reviewing various examples);
id. at 104 ("The puzzle that motivates this paper is that a large and sophisticated body of
work, primarily produced by economists, implies that contracts should be complex,
whereas in fact they are generally simple."); see also JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A
MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS

140 (1975) (describing that most agreements cover similar ground and even share similar
language).
102 Several scholars have pointed to status quo bias as a possible cause of contract
standardization. The status quo bias is a psychological tendency to prefer the present state
of the world and to resist either buying something that you do not own or selling
something that is yours. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in
Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 359 (1996) (citing William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser,
Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988)); Russell
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (1998).
103 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardizationand Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713
(1997); see also Mark A. Lemiey & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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threat of strategic behavior prevents parties from complex contracting. 0 4 To
create a tailored term requires disclosing information about one's interests
and preferences. This, again, permits exploitation. In the absence of trust,
parties may resort to a standard term to minimize this risk.
A mediator might help the parties to overcome these strategic
difficulties, thereby permitting more complex contracting. Again, a mediator
can solicit and compare information from each side, potentially finding
value-creating trades. The mediator might test the viability of various
packages of trades of legal terms, asking each side in confidence which of
several sets of terms the party would accept, but not revealing the origin of
the various packages. In this way, the mediator can surmount the adverse
selection problems that might otherwise prevent tailoring contract language
during the deal's closing stage.
d. Renegotiation (and Planningfor RenegotiationDuring Closing)
Many deals do not end at closing. Instead, in complex transactions the
parties may revisit their initial agreement and renegotiate key terms that were
either originally left open or have become inefficient or outdated. Here I
briefly consider the use of mediators to manage disputes that arise during the
renegotiation phase, but then focus primarily on how transactional mediators
can help parties during closing to incorporate legal terms ex ante that
constrain ex post opportunism.
In an ideal world, renegotiation seems to weaken the economic
justifications for using a transactional mediator. If the parties discover
contract inefficiencies after closing, they can simply renegotiate those
provisions of the agreement. Thus, significant Pareto-optimizing
improvements will ultimately be found, even if overlooked in the parties'
original interaction.
This ideal is certainly realized in some circumstances. Parties can use
renegotiation to adjust deal terms in the face of new information, and may
take this opportunity to make their transaction more efficient. Renegotiation
will not always be easy, however. Sometimes parties will see renegotiation as
an occasion to extract additional concessions, not as a collaborative chance to
improve efficiency. In particular, as the relational contracting literature has
long explored, 10 5 renegotiation can be difficult if the parties have made
relationship-specific investments that lock them into a bilateral monopoly. 106
104 See Eggleston et al., supra note 101, at 109 ("Simplicity... is the result of
strategic concealment of information.").
105 See supra note 12.
106 See Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 67, at 241 (describing
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For example, if an employee has invested in special knowledge that is
valuable only to his employer (e.g., learning internal systems or
technologies), and his employer has similarly invested in the employee, when
it comes time to renegotiate salary the parties may be reluctant to look
elsewhere for an alternate trading partner. 107 Because the market does not
serve as a constraint on their bargaining-if the employer offers too little it
will be difficult for the employee credibly to threaten to seek employment
elsewhere, and vice versa-one or both parties may behave opportunistically
during renegotiation. 0 8 As Williamson explains:
[J]oined as they are in an idiosyncratic condition of bilateral monopoly,
both buyer and seller are strategically situated to bargain over the
disposition of any incremental gain whenever a proposal to adapt is made
by the other party. Although both have a long-term interest in effecting
adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind, each also has an interest in
appropriating as much of the gains as he can on each occasion to adapt.
Efficient adaptations which would otherwise be made thus result in costly
haggling or even go unmentioned .... 10 9

In short, disputes that arise during renegotiation can be difficult for parties to
resolve because of the temptation to extract opportunistic gains as soon as
both parties are locked into a long-term relationship by relationship-specific
investments.
Mediators-particularly arbitrators-are now commonly used to help
control post-contractual opportunism l0 in various contexts, including longterm contracts with the government" 1 and commercial construction
consequences of this transformation); see also Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?
The Economics of PromissoryEstoppel in PreliminaryNegotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249,

1280 (1996) (discussing the holdup problems that occur during contract modification or
renegotiation).
107 See, e.g., John J. Donohue HI, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes
to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 592 (1989) (describing how an
employment relationship may become a bilateral monopoly once the employment
agreement is signed).
108 See Scott E. Masten et al., The Costs of Organization,7 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 1, 6
(1991) (arguing that such situations are characterized by increased "resources expended
attempting to negotiate a favorable distribution of the gains from trade").
109 Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics, supra note 67, at 242.
110 Williamson called this type of intervention "trilateral governance." Id. at 249.
Ian Macneil similarly considered the use of arbitrators in long-term contracts. See Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 867 (1978).
111 See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete
Contracts:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Air Force Engine Procurement,24 RAND J. EcON.
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contracts. 112 Although this offers some support for my general argument that
mediators can add value in transactions, I must draw a distinction between
two uses of mediators in renegotiation. If parties merely hire a mediator to
help them resolve a dispute over contractual terms rather than litigate that
disagreement, this use of a mediator seems more akin to traditional mediator
intervention in litigation than to the sorts of transactional interventions I am
concerned with in this Article. If, however, parties use a mediator to help
them discuss improvements on or extensions of their contract-extensions
that essentially create a new deal rather than resolve a dispute about their old
contract-this would be an example of transactional mediation as I conceive
it. Both types of intervention are plausible, but there is no existing empirical
evidence to suggest which type occurs most frequently when mediators
currently intervene in renegotiation.
Rather than focus on the use of mediators to intervene during
renegotiation, however, I am more concerned here with the ways in which a
mediator can add value pre-closing.In addition to using mediators during the
renegotiation stage to resolve disputes, parties may also try to mitigate postcontractual opportunism through tailored contract terms that create incentives
to comply. A contract without such safeguards will impose greater costs on a
party expecting to make transaction-specific investments, and that party will
therefore set a higher price for the transaction. To the extent that contract
terms can be used to constrain the threat of opportunism, it will increase the
surplus available in the transaction. This aspect of transactional lawyering
1 14
has been well-explored 13 and documented.
Parties, however, may not always avail themselves of such opportunismconstraining terms. First, by the time negotiating parties (or their lawyers)
conclude their closing stage negotiations, they may not sufficiently trust each
other to rely on contractual solutions to future moral hazard problems.
126 (1993) (discussing third-party systems to keep long-term government contracts
functioning in the face of strategic behavior).
112 Disagreements in commercial construction contracts are traditionally referred to
the architect or project engineer for resolution. See Stipanowich, The Multi-Door
Contract,supra note 12, at 358. In recent years this tradition has evolved, particularly in
large projects. Standing panels of mediator engineers and experts are now sometimes
employed to provide "real-time" dispute resolution as a construction project unfolds. See
id. at 362-64.
113 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 5.
114 Empirical studies indicate that contract complexity increases with the threat of
future opportunism (as measured by reputation for litigation, past litigious behavior, etc.).
See Crocker & Reynolds, supra 111, at 145 ("A record of past opportunistic behavior or
the potential for hold-up in a sole-source environment... increases the likelihood of ex
post redistributive efforts with the attendant bargaining costs, and results in the use of
more complete contracts [ex ante].").
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that "earnouts," for example, even if negotiated
carefully, are often bought out from M&A deals just prior to closing.1 15 The
parties know that the "earnout" provision's legal constraints on future
opportunism will be imperfect, and by the closing date the parties may no
longer trust each other enough to overcome doubts about such opportunism.
To the extent that using a mediator throughout a transaction can help the
parties better maintain trust, the parties might be more inclined to rely on
such potentially value-creating terms.
Second, even if the parties do trust each other, they may avoid discussing
such opportunism-constraining terms for fear of destroying that trust. Edward
Bernstein has described the problem of "attitudinal costs" in transactional
bargaining.11 6 When a party suggests crafting tailored contract provisions
that are obviously intended to minimize the threat of future opportunism by
the other party, that other party may receive the suggestion badly. The
receiving party may perceive the suggestion as a signal that future
disagreements will have to be resolved through formal contracting rather
than more informal, friendly means. This may cause mistrust or suspicion
and lead the receiving party to become more guarded or adversarial. This, in
turn:
[M]ay reduce the value of the transaction if it contemplates a continuing
relationship or performance over time, such as a partnership, joint venture
or construction contract. If negotiations are hostile, each party can expect a
reduced probability of voluntary performance by the other who, if he has
concluded that acting in the spirit of the transaction will not be reciprocated,
will be more inclined to base his breach or perform decisions upon a
comparison of legal sanctions against the benefit of breach. 117
Bernstein has analogized this to the risk for a personal relationship created by
18
suggesting the negotiation of a prenuptial agreement.1
Such attitudinal costs may prevent parties from adopting efficient
contract terms. For example, parties may be unwilling to avail themselves
explicitly of Oliver Williamson's solution to moral hazard problems-the use
115

An eamout is a means of dealing with differences in expectations about future

valuation of an asset. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing earnouts); see
also REED & LAJOUX, supra note 92, at 118-19 (discussing this problem).
116 See Bernstein, supra note 94, at 231 n. 111. This is a familiar theme in contract.
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (noting that "[tihere is a hesitancy to speak of legal rights
or to threaten to sue in... negotiations" when there will be an ongoing relationship); see
also Eggleston et al., supra note 101, at 118-19 (citing sources).
117 Bernstein, supra note 94, at 231.
118 See id.
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of hostages. 119 As Williamson has explained, a hostage can dampen future
opportunistic behavior if the hostage-taker derives little intrinsic benefit from
the hostage (and is therefore unlikely to be opportunistic in using the
hostage) but can impose significant pain on the hostage-giver by retaining the
hostage. 12 0 Although hostage-taking may be efficient under some
circumstances, parties may avoid them because "a request for the delivery of
12 1
a hostage signals an absence of trust."
A mediator might add value in closing stage negotiations by facilitating
discussion over such terms while minimizing the downside risk to the
parties' relationship. As discussed above, 122 a mediator can add noise to the
parties' communications and therefore change the strategic implications of
the signals sent. A mediator, for example, might disguise the origins of a
proposal incorporating certain hostage-taking terms (or other terms designed
to constrain future opportunism). Or a mediator might lay out several
different packages of legal terms, some of which incorporate such
constraints, and encourage the parties to contrast the packages and rank them
in terms of how satisfied each package makes each party. By comparing the
rankings, the mediator could discern which package of terms best served the
parties' needs. The mediator could then present that package as a Paretooptimizing solution to the myriad problems dealt with by the contract, in
effect shifting the parties' attention away from the "attitudinal costs"
Bernstein describes and towards the value-creating benefits of incorporating
opportunism-constraining language.
The point, in short, is that mediators can do more to manage the strategic
problems that arise during renegotiation than merely participating-pursuant
to an ADR clause in the original closing documents-in a dispute resolution
system that kicks in when renegotiation occurs. A mediator can assist parties
during their originalnegotiation to facilitate efficient contractual solutions to
future renegotiation problems. Again, a mediator may add value during the

119 This use of the term "hostage" refers to giving another party something of value
as a bond guaranteeing that you will perform as you have promised. If you fail to
perform, they keep the hostage.
120 See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 522-26 (1983); see also David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 406-07 (1990)

(describing hostages).
121 Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist Transaction Cost

Engineer, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 46 (2000). Transactional lawyers may attempt to
create "hidden" or "latent" hostages by sneaking over-inclusive contractual language past
opposing counsel. See id. at 47-48 (redescribing aggressive transactional lawyering as
the attempt to create value by inserting hidden hostages into commercial contracts).
122 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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closing stage negotiations over legal terms, in this case by helping the parties
to plan most efficiently for renegotiation.
C. Two PotentialProblems
This Part has argued that mediators can add value in transactions by
helping parties to overcome transaction costs that arise because of strategic
behavior in bargaining. Throughout, I have assumed rational, self-interested
parties. Before turning in Part I to a second set of behavioral justifications
for transactional mediation, I must pause to consider two potential objections
to my argument.
1. The Problem of "Gaming the Mediator"
The first potential problem is simple: just as parties try to manipulate
each other, they will try to manipulate a mediator for their own advantage,
thereby eliminating or greatly reducing the mediator's ability to help parties
overcome information asymmetries or adverse selection.
Mediators are not omnipotent. They cannot simply command full
disclosure or expect that parties will drop strategic ambitions merely because
a mediator is polite or friendly. Instead, we should expect that in some
circumstances parties will try to maximize their own gains by
misrepresenting information to the mediator. A plaintiff actually willing to
settle her litigation for $100,000 may swear to the mediator in a private
caucus that she will not accept less than $250,000. If the mediator in some
way pressures the defendant to settle on those terms, the plaintiff will have
turned the mediator into an unwitting ally. Similarly, in the various sorts of
transactions discussed above-mergers and acquisitions, employment
negotiations, real estate transactions-one can assume that some parties will
choose to try to "game" the mediator.
How often parties attempt to deceive mediators is an empirical question
that deserves study. To the extent that a mediator's ability to add value by
overcoming information asymmetries depends on the mediator receiving
accurate information-about reservation price, interests, priorities, etc.from the parties, widespread successful gaming of mediators obviously
detracts from this argument for mediators. Although I cannot resolve this
issue here, several things suggest that we should not be too hasty to dismiss
the economic rationale that mediators can mitigate adverse selection.
First, the explosive growth of mediation in the litigation field suggests
demand for mediator services. It is unlikely that such growth has all been
supply-driven, irrational, or justified only by the psychological and emotional
benefits mediators can provide. I think it more plausible to assume that
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mediators are in fact helping parties to overcome the information
asymmetries that make bargaining so difficult.
Second, Brown and Ayres explain that parties may disclose honestly if a
mediator can threaten credibly to terminate the parties' negotiations should
their offers--conveyed confidentially through the mediator-fail to
overlap. 12 3 At a practical level, this threat is obviously a difficult one to
enforce. In either litigation or a transaction, parties can easily participate in
mediation, do their best to game the mediator (running the risk of deadlock),
and then re-open negotiations face-to-face should the mediation fail to
produce a viable agreement.
At the same time, Brown and Ayres' suggestion may not be entirely
misplaced. To the extent that parties feel that they must eventually reach
agreement (because they bargain under bilateral monopoly or quasi-bilateral
monopoly conditions), their desire to overcome their differences and get the
deal done may lead them to be open with a mediator. Negotiating parties
often discover that holding out for more doesn't always work. If both sides
play the same game, it may result in delay, deadlock, or escalation rather
than strategic advantage. At some point, parties may decide that the time has
come to see whether a deal is possible, essentially self-imposing the deadline
that Brown and Ayres suggest a mediator should threaten. If such parties are
willing to turn to a mediator for assistance, they may be willing to reveal
information honestly to that mediator. This also bolsters my argument that
mediators may add value primarily during closing stage negotiations over
legal terms and conditions. As a deal's closing date approaches, lawyers and
their clients may become increasingly willing to reveal information to a
mediator in hopes that the mediator can help them overcome remaining
disagreements.
Third, in some circumstances self-interest will temper dishonesty. If
transacting parties made use of Raiffa's "contract embellishment" procedure,
for example, and hired a mediator to find Pareto-optimizing trades that would
make one or both better off, there would be little incentive to lie to that
mediator. To some extent, the critique that parties will game mediators rests
on the assumption that mediators serve primarily to compare parties'
reservation prices. If parties seek mediator assistance in finding valuecreating trades, however, the critique may have less force.
Finally, a mediator does not need perfect information to add value. Even
if a mediator learns only a fraction of the truth, the mediator may be able to
prevent unnecessary deadlock, or help the parties to find value-creating
terms, if it is a fraction more information than the parties would otherwise
exchange. Thus, although parties may try to game a mediator, if the mediator
123 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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is sufficiently skilled to glean any useful information from such parties the
mediator may be able to do her job.
In short, although I certainly acknowledge the practical difficulties with
the economic argument for transactional mediators, I believe that mediators
are sometimes able to overcome information asymmetries.
2. The Problem of Self-Interested TransactionalMediators
Just as mediators are not omnipotent, neither are they perfect.
Introducing a mediator into a transaction adds a new set of problems: a
mediator may act on her own interests rather than the parties'. The problem
of disloyal mediators is intriguing but has rarely been examined. What fee
structure is optimal to dampen self-interested behavior by a mediator or
arbitrator, for example? Can a mediator accept a percentage of a transactional
agreement or a litigated settlement and remain neutral? Is a flat fee more
optimal than hourly billing? Although these questions are beyond the scope
of this Article, 124 I must respond to the concern that introducing a mediator
in transactions will do more harm than good because of the possibility of
disloyalty.
To sidestep the problem somewhat, I have assumed in this Article that a
transactional mediator will work on a flat or hourly fee. This reduces the
incentive problems that would naturally arise if such a mediator could take a
percentage of the transaction price. Even with a flat or hourly incentive
structure, however, there may be an incentive problem. An hourly fee
obviously creates a marginal incentive to prolong the negotiations, whereas a
flat fee tempts a mediator to shirk in order to close the deal quickly.
These incentive problems are present vis-A-vis mediators in litigation as
well. In transactions, however, parties may think that these incentive issues
pale in comparison to the more fundamental problem that a mediator might
be driven to close deals in order to build a reputation based on her success
rate in closing deals. 125 That success rate provides a salient and tangible
measure of the mediator's abilities. As businesspeople and their lawyers
search for mediators to help with contract formation, they could easily
compare mediators based on their history of bringing deals to fruition.
The problem, of course, is that if a mediator becomes driven to close
deals, then she loses her impartiality and objectivity. Not all deals should
124 For a discussion of fee structures in dispute mediation, see Scott Peppet,
ContractarianEconomics and Mediation Ethics: The Casefor Customizing Neutrality
Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REv 227 (2003).
125 See Ron S. Fortgang et al., Negotiating the Spirit of the Deal, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Feb. 1, 2003, at 66 (discussing the problem of intermediaries seeking to push a deal
through despite obvious indicators that the deal should not close).
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close. Moreover, to earn the parties' trust and confidence, the parties must
believe that the mediator is not trying to force them to reach agreement.
We know little about reputational markets for mediators in the litigation
context, and nothing about such markets in the transactional arena. The more
sophisticated such reputational markets, the less one need worry about selfinterested mediators misdirecting transacting parties. In other words, if a
transactional mediator acquires a reputation not merely for closing deals, but
for closing successful deals or for helping the parties to create value through
efficient trades, a mediator will have less incentive to rush to closure.
Mediators will moderate their own behavior because it is in their own selfinterest to do so.
This presents a paradox, however. One might concede that such
sophisticated reputational markets could arise in some contexts, but then
doubt that transactional mediators would be necessary in those contexts.
Such sophisticated reputational markets are more likely among sophisticated
parties-in high stakes mergers, for example, or other contexts in which
informed businesspeople transact regularly. If information flows sufficiently
freely amongst such parties to rely on markets vis-A-vis a mediator's
reputation, isn't it likely that such parties will also be able to conduct their
transactions without mediator assistance? Put differently, won't it be easiest
to find high-quality mediators in those very contexts in which they are not
needed, leaving mediators of lesser or more questionable quality in less
sophisticated markets in which their services are more likely to be in
demand?
The power of this argument depends on several as-of-yet untested
assumptions. First, that mediators will act on their short-term self-interest,
particularly reputational interest, to their clients' detriment. Second, that
mediators will base their reputations on success rate, defined narrowly.
Third, that if a more sophisticated reputational market for mediator services
arises, it will necessarily correlate with a decreased need for such services.
These assumptions may be inaccurate. Very sophisticated parties will
sometimes behave foolishly. In addition, sometimes a sophisticated party will
transact with a less sophisticated party-someone less accustomed to the
merger context, for example, who does not know "how the game is played"
or the relevant norms for completing such a transaction. In those unbalanced
transactions, a mediator may be of particular assistance in overcoming
emotional and relational breakdowns, transferring information, and
facilitating discussion. Finally, potentially disloyal mediators may be
constrained by moral considerations, ethics codes, conflict of interest
regulations, the threat of malpractice or suit, or fear about establishing a poor
reputation.
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I generally assume that the problem of disloyal mediators, although
worth consideration, can be managed. Just as mediators' conflicts of interest
have been a central concern in the litigation context for some time, so in the
transactional context the problem of disloyal mediators will be one of the
practical hurdles to overcome. I doubt, however, that concern over disloyalty
will significantly depress demand for transactional mediators.
111. BEHAVIORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRANSACTIONAL MEDIATION

In combination, discovering gains from trade and optimizing gains from
trade are the two central economic justifications for mediation. Even if
parties are thinking clearly and rationally, they may still behave strategically
to their detriment. Thus they may need a mediator's help to overcome these
strategic barriers to settlement.
This Part explores how mediators can help contracting parties to manage
psychological, emotional, and relational issues that may also impede
reaching agreement. This is in keeping with recent work in behavioral law
and economics that has highlighted ways in which real negotiators deviate
from the assumptions of rational actor models.
A. Overcoming PsychologicalBarriersto Negotiation
In the last decade, negotiation scholars have identified a variety of
126
cognitive and social psychological barriers to the resolution of disputes
and have considered the ways in which a third-party neutral may help parties
to overcome these barriers. 127 Even those more interested in purely economic
126 See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 2

(1992) (discussing common decisionmaking biases); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
PsychologicalBarriersto Litigation Settlement: An ExperimentalApproach, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 107, 160 (1994) (considering how "framing, equity seeking, and reactive
devaluation.., prevent some parties from settling") Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 77, 137 (1997) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and
Settlement] (providing experimental evidence that lawyers and clients evaluate settlement
options differently). Several seminal early works contributed to this literature on
psychological barriers to negotiation. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 20 (1982) (explaining how heuristics parties
employ in the face of uncertainty can lead to "systematic and predictable errors").
127 See BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 143 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995) (summarizing roles of an intermediary in negotiations); Richard Birke & Craig R.
Fox, Psychological Principlesin Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv.
1, 49 (1999) (suggesting that a mutually trusted intermediary may help parties overcome
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justifications for mediation acknowledge the importance of these rationales
for neutral intervention. 12 8 Without reviewing this literature in depth, this
section briefly describes some of these barriers to dispute resolution that are
equally applicable to transactions and how a transactional neutral might help
parties to overcome these barriers.

1. FairnessEffects
Neutrals can help contracting parties avoid bargaining inefficiencies
caused by fairness effects. In short, people care about fairness and are
sometimes willing to kill a deal over it, and their assessments of fairness are
often biased and self-serving. A neutral can do more than an agent to
overcome the problems this creates.
Economists have long used ultimatum game experiments to probe
situations in which fairness concerns cause bargaining inefficiencies. In an
ultimatum game, two subjects are given a prize or amount to split. The
"proposer" must move first, offering the responder a division of the prize. If
the responder accepts the division, each party receives their share of the
prize. If the responder rejects the proposed split, each receives nothing.
Classical rational choice models assume that a responder will accept any
division, no matter how lop-sided, so long as it pays the responder
something, given that rejecting the division leads to a zero payoff for the
29
responder. Without reviewing the extensive literature on ultimatum games, 1
suffice to say that this is not how people actually behave. 130 Responders
psychological barriers); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of
Barriersto the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 235, 248-49 (1993).
128 See Brown & Ayres, supra note 31, at 329 ("[P]arties to a mediation rarely
behave in a purely rational way; overcoming psychological barriers to negotiation will
always be an important part of the mediator's function.").
129 For an overview of ultimatum game literature, see Colin Camerer & Richard H.

Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 211-12
(1995).
130 That individuals sometimes seek fairness instead of purely maximizing selfinterest has been a concern of economists for some time. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et
al., Fairnessand the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. 285 (1986) (exploring how
standard economic models can be enriched by taking fairness perceptions into account);
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairnessas a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the
Market, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 728, 729 (1986) (proposing a theory of fairness based on
"dual entitlement"); Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum
Bargaining,3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982). More recently, negotiation analysts
have examined fairness seeking in the settlement of disputes. See, e.g., Birke & Fox,
supra note 127, at 36; Jonathan R. Cohen, ReasoningAlong Different Lines: Some Varied
Roles of Rationality in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv.
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often reject extremely lop-sided proposals, and-anticipating this-proposers
often offer more equitable splits than one might expect. 131 Although
experimental economics in this area is complex and evolving, 132 for our
purposes the point is simple: transacting parties sometimes are willing to
forego doing business together if they feel forced to do so on grossly unfair
33

terms. 1

This attention to fairness is made more complex by the fact that
behavioral research has shown that parties' interpretations and assessments

111, 117 (1998) ("A party may refuse a settlement that it believes to be unfair even if this
refusal functions to the party's detriment.").
131 Under conditions of perfect information a proposer would know the responder's
preferences and tolerances, and could therefore tailor his proposal to ensure that it would
be accepted by the responder. In other words, if a given responder would accept no less
than $3 of a $10 division, the proposer would offer $3.01. Inefficiencies result from
information asymmetries about tolerances. The proposer does not know the responder's
actual preferences, and therefore acts on her own assumptions about what the responder
will do. Sometimes this leads to offering too little-as when the proposer offers $.01 and
it is rejected-and sometimes the proposer offers too much.
132 See Ernst Fehr et al., Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?An Experimental
Investigation, 108 Q.J. ECON. 437, 438-39 (1993) (experimenting on the impact of
fairness on market prices); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness,
Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817, 820-22 (1999) (developing a model
of inequity aversion). For a general overview of experimental economics, see Elizabeth
Hoffman, Bibliography of Work on Experimental Economics, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1025
(1985).
133 A study by Camerer and Loewenstein illustrates that fairness matters to
contracting parties. The experimenters asked MBA students to negotiate over the
simulated sale of a piece of land. In the first round, buyers knew only the value of the
land and sellers knew only its cost. All negotiating pairs were able to reach agreement. In
the second round of the experiment, the same pairs renegotiated after being given full and
symmetrical information about cost or value. Despite having more information about
their opponent's reservation price, 20% of pairs failed to reach agreement. Students who
had captured a large portion of the available gains from trade in the first round sought to
hold onto those gains in the second round. Those students who had not negotiated a
favorable agreement in the first round, however, often wanted to be compensated for
being treated unfairly. The result was increased bargaining impasse. See Colin F.
Camerer & George Loewenstein, Information, Fairness,and Efficiency in Bargaining,in
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATION 155,

178 (Barbara

A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993). On the idea of parties turning down Pareto
efficient offers if they feel treated unfairly, see Korobkin, supra note 66, at 1818
("[N]egotiators will demand fair deal points and might reject unfair deal points, even
when this means turning down a proposed agreement that falls within the bargaining
zone."); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MKTG. SCI. 199,
205 (1985) (distinguishing "acquisition utility" from "transactional utility").
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of fairness are often self-serving. 134 In an often-replicated study, for
example, subjects designated plaintiffs' or defense counsel, given the same
facts about a dispute, and asked to assess the odds of success, tend to think
that their own case is stronger than the other side's. 135 In other words, each
side's interpretation of the facts depends on and is biased in favor of its
assigned role. Similar experiments have been done regarding wage disputes
in the collective bargaining context. Even with symmetrical information,
when participants randomly assigned to either the labor or management
condition are asked to assess a "fair wage" from a neutral's perspective, they
bias their assessments in a self-serving fashion. 136 Similarly, experiments in
the collective bargaining context show that parties are often biased in the
comparison data that they select as they attempt to determine what a fair
contract price would be.' 37 Raiffa's informal experiments with executives
also suggest that self-serving assessments occur in transactions. Executives
given extensive information about both an acquiring and target corporation
and asked to assess a "fair" price for the transaction consistently make selfinterested fairness assessments based on their assigned role in the
simulation. 138
This may contribute to more adversarial negotiations. If I believe that
you are being unfair or that I am contributing more to our mutual
enterprise, 139 I am likely to retaliate-as by rejecting a proposal in an
134 See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 119 (1997); see generally Linda
Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1337
(1995); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining,22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993).
135 See, e.g., David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the
Limits to Negotiation, 1 NEGOT. J. 163, 165 (1985) (citing studies).
136 See, e.g., Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretationsof
Fairnessand InterpersonalConflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176
(1992) (describing a study which concluded that assessments in bargaining are often
biased in a self-serving fashion).
137 See Linda Babcock et al., Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in
Negotiations that Reflect a Self-Serving Bias, 111 Q. J. EcON. 1, 16 (1996) (presenting a
study showing that "parties involved in labor negotiations select comparison groups in a
self-serving fashion, and that the magnitude of this bias helps to predict impasse").
138 See RAIFFA, supra note 15, at 94.
139 Both parties in a negotiation may believe that they are making the majority of the
contributions to the deal's success. One early study showed, for example, that a husband
and wife may each believe that they are more responsible for doing household chorescooking, cleaning, shopping, caring for children-than the other. See Michael Ross &
Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 327 (1979).
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ultimatum game--or to try to capture greater gains for myself. 140 Moreover,
people tend to be unaware of the egocentric nature of their fairness
assessments. 14 1 Each party is likely to see the other's arguments, claims, and
positions as less valid and the other side as less flexible and understanding,
while simultaneously interpreting their own actions generously.
Agents can certainly help. An investment banker or lawyer may be
experienced with pricing and closing transactions and may counsel her
principal not to be overly aggressive or to issue an ultimatum. Similarly, an
agent may be better able than her principal to see the self-serving nature of
the principal's assessments of the other side. Nevertheless, a neutral may be
better able than an agent to help parties overcome such self-serving
assessments. An agent may fall prey to the same biases as her principal,
whereas a neutral may be less susceptible. 142 A lawyer, for example, may
interpret the other side's actions as over-reaching while seeing herself as
entirely reasonable. Given that a lawyer's task is to represent a client
vigorously and to defend his interests, a lawyer may be predisposed to such
biases, as the experiments summarized above seem to suggest. 143
A neutral, by contrast, is in an ideal position to identify self-serving
assessments by one or both parties. At a substantive level, if the neutral has
sufficient expertise she can check each side's assumptions about "what's
fair" and keep the parties from locking in to diverging stories about how a
transaction should be priced or closed. Moreover, the mediator may be able
to offer a neutral assessment or fair proposal that the parties will adopt. 144 In
140 See Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et al., Egocentric Interpretationsof Fairnessin
Asymmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas Explaining Harvesting Behavior and the
Role of Communication, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 111, 124-25
(1996) (showing that egocentric fairness judgments may cause over-claiming in social
dilemmas).
141 See Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution
and How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 213, 224 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (reviewing

literature).
142 This is an empirical assertion that deserves testing. To date I have found no
studies drawing this comparison, although the conclusion I reach here is certainly
intuitive.
143 See Jean R. Stemlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a NonadversarialSetting, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269, 336-38 (1999) (suggesting that lawyers may suffer from
overconfidence or have diverging incentives from clients). But see Korobkin & Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics and Settlement, supra note 126, at 108 (suggesting that lawyers
are less likely than clients to be influenced by such factors).
144 Russell Korobkin has noted that a mediator can serve to identify a focal point or
solution among the range of possible solutions to a dispute. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN,
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an ultimatum game, for example, Schelling has argued (and shown with a
simple experiment) that when a mediator approaches each side and proposes
a reasonable split, even without further communication with each other or the
mediator, the parties are likely to use that proposal in making their
decision. 145 At a procedural or process level, a neutral can also help the
parties avoid spinning very biased interpretations of how their bargaining is
unfolding. In short, a neutral may be able to mitigate the effects of
transacting parties' self-serving assessments of fairness.
2. Reactive Devaluation
Negotiating parties must constantly assess information received from the
other side. Sometimes it is wise to doubt the other side's offers and to
investigate whether concessions are genuine or somehow duplicitous.
Research has shown, however, that negotiators can be overly suspicious.
They sometimes overly devalue an opponent's proposal or concession merely
because their opponent made it.
For example, imagine that a disputant is considering two possible
agreements that would resolve her dispute: Solution A and Solution B. If the
disputant knows nothing about the origin of the two solutions, and does not
know which solution her opponent favors, she would, all things considered,
prefer Solution A. It meets her interests more completely than Solution B.
Now imagine that the disputant discovers that Solution A is in fact the offer
proposed by her opponent. Research shows that this information about the
offer's origin will often taint a disputant's evaluation of the merits of the two
proposals. She may no longer prefer Solution A, merely because the other
side proposed it.
This phenomenon is known as "reactive devaluation." Others have
reviewed the reactive devaluation literature and its most famous examples. 146
For our purposes the point is clear: reactive devaluation can obviously make
it difficult to reach agreement. 14 7 If each side devalues the other's proposals,
they may never find a mutually-agreeable resolution to their dispute.
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 352-53 (2002) ("[A] mediator's recommended
settlement... can itself serve as an independent focal point that can justify both parties'

agreement.").
145 See SCHELLING, supra note 35, at 62-63, 63 n.4 (describing the problem and a
simple experiment showing that people settled on the mediator's focal point).
146 See Birke & Fox, supra note 127, at 48-49; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology,
Economics and Settlement, supra note 126, at 150-53; Sternlight, supra note 143, at 312-

13.
147 See Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriersto Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT.
J. 389, 394-95 (1991); see also Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and
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Reactive devaluation could be just as pronounced in transactional
bargaining as in disputes. A buyer might devalue a seller's offer, sure that it
is biased in the seller's favor. A corporate attorney might distrust the other
side's first draft of a contract, and automatically "devalue" the terms therein
without truly examining those terms to determine whether any of them are
sensible. If each side reactively devalues the other's proposals, bargaining
may become unnecessarily adversarial.
Unlike an agent, a neutral can help parties to overcome reactive
devaluation in transactional bargaining by either adding noise to the parties'
communication or proposing solutions of her own. Adding noise may be as
simple as raising Party A's proposed solution privately with Party B without
telling B that the idea came from Party A. If B assumes that the idea
originated with the neutral, B may be more willing to consider it on the
merits.
In addition, a transactional neutral might propose solutions of her own.
Although many "facilitative" mediators in the litigation context criticize
those neutrals who are willing to give parties a neutral evaluation of the
merits of a case or direct them towards a particular solution, 14 8 empirical
research shows that many, and perhaps most, neutrals do in fact engage in
some sort of case evaluation to help settle litigation. 149 In transactions,
mediators could similarly propose terms and conditions or packages of trades
that the parties had not considered. As Thomas Schelling has explained:
[A] mediator can do more than simply constrain communications-putting
limits on the order of offers, counter-offers, and so forth-since he can
invent contextual material of his own and make potent suggestions. That is,
he can influence the other player's expectations on his own
initiative .... When there is no apparent focal point for agreement, he can
150
create one by his power to make a dramatic suggestion.

Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 34 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al.

eds., 1995).
148 The debate between facilitative and evaluative mediators is long-standing and
complex. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 24-38

(1996) (discussing the debate and offering a framework for analysis).
149 See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases:
What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 656

(2002) (reporting that mediators evaluated for the parties in 31% of cases, suggested
possible settlement options in 69% of cases, and recommended a particular settlement
option in 28% of cases); id. at 656 n.58 (citing other studies).
150 SCHELLING, supra note 35, at 144.
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Whatever its other benefits or drawbacks, at the very least directing parties in
this way may overcome the effects of reactive devaluation.
3. Framingand Endowment Effects
Economics has traditionally assumed that a negotiator's preferences are
exogenous vis-A-vis a good to be traded. In other words, although a given
negotiator might prefer the good more and another less, how much someone
cares for a particular good should not be affected by whether that person is
buying or selling it.
Behavioral research suggests, however, that preferences may vary
depending on the initial allocation of resources or property. People tend to
overvalue items they own as compared to items they do not. 15 1 In other
words, people demand more to give up something they already own than they
will offer to purchase the same item. In one classic study, experimenters gave
subjects a coffee mug and offered them a choice to keep the mug or to sell it
for an unspecified but predetermined price. These subjects had to write down
the price at which they would sell the mug. Another group did not receive
mugs. Instead, they had to write down how much they were willing to pay to
acquire one. The study found that the median asking price for sellers was
$7.12, whereas the median offer price from buyers was $2.87.152
A further experiment showed that such endowment effects can inhibit
bargaining and trades. The experimenters again gave some subjects coffee
mugs. This time, however, the subjects with mugs were paired with a
bargaining counterpart to whom they could sell the mugs. As the endowment
effect would predict, fewer trades occurred than one would expect. Sellers
required more than buyers were willing to pay. 15 3 Similarly, research has
shown that subjects' investment decisions-whether to invest in high-risk,
moderate risk, or low-risk investments-can vary depending on whether the
subject makes the choice from a clean slate (holding no existing securities) or
already has certain securities in his portfolio. 154 And recent studies in the
151 For an overview of this literature, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 61 (1993); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 193, 194-97 (1991).
152 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1325, 1339 (1990); see generally Jack L. Knetsch &
J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: ExperimentalEvidence of
an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) (conducting a

similar experiment).
153 See Kahneman et al., supra note 152, at 1340-41.
154 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
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legal domain suggest that contracting parties may prefer status quo contract
155
terms more than novel ones.
A neutral may be less susceptible to the endowment effect than a partisan
agent, 156 and therefore able to help parties to overcome it. For example, a
neutral may be able to provide both sides with market information against
which they can test their (biased) evaluations. This is particularly plausible
vis-A-vis the legal terms and conditions in a contract. 157 A lawyer-neutral
might be familiar with the legal norms in a given context and be able to point
the parties towards compromise legal language. Similarly, the lawyer might
be able to help the parties overcome their reliance on status quo legal
terms-or the formulaic terms used in standard form contracts-and innovate
based on their interests and preferences. Rather than start with a standard
form or with a first draft, which would typically become the original
endowment against which the parties compared, the neutral could manage the
negotiation process so that the parties instead would work collaboratively to
build a contract draft from framework through to completion. 158 The neutral
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 31 (1988) (finding that only 28% of TIAA/CREF
retirement fund participants had ever changed their distribution of premium between
stocks and bonds despite large annual variations in rates of return and the fact that they
could do so for free).
155 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,

1104-08 (2000) (providing an overview of prospect theory, framing effects, and status
quo bias); see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation:
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583,

1588-93 (1998) (providing experimental evidence).
156 This is an empirical proposition about which I can find no empirical research.
Nevertheless, the proposition seems intuitively sound. To the extent that an agent takes
on the principal's interests as her own, she may be subject to the same loss aversion that
drives the endowment effect in her principal's assessments. A neutral, however, is
unlikely to feel loss aversion or, conversely, attached to the status quo.
157 A neutral might also help two contracting parties overcome endowment effects
in valuation or pricing. This is somewhat less likely, however, for the following reason. If
a neutral were able to accumulate accurate information about the correct price for a given
sort of transaction-such as the purchase of residential real estate or the sale of corporate
assets-the neutral would be well-positioned to exploit that information for his own
advantage by trading upon it for his own account. In other words, by the time the neutral
had invested sufficiently in acquiring such information, the neutral could participate in
the market as a principal rather than as a neutral. Indeed, in some markets we see agents
participating as principals. For example, a residential real estate broker might "pick off'
properties that she knows are especially cheap. If neutrals (or agents) with superior
pricing information leave the market in this way, it is unlikely that the remaining neutrals
will have a great deal more information relevant to pricing than the principals already
possess.
158 See FISHER ET AL., supra note 70, at 112-16 (suggesting this sort of "one text"
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might thus help the parties to overcome their tendency to prefer those terms
or conditions that they viewed as their original "endowment."
B. Managing Attributions, Emotions, and Relationships
In addition to managing information exchange and helping parties to
overcome these cognitive and social psychological biases, a neutral can help
parties to manage emotional and relational difficulties in their
negotiations. 159 This may facilitate trust and permit more efficient outcomes.
This section briefly explains why a transactional neutral may be better able
than an agent to overcome the most challenging relational problems that
contracting parties face.
1. Attributions and Emotions
People tend to try to explain the events they experience, even if doing so
requires inventing attributions or stories about others, circumstances, and
causation. 160 Sometimes these attributions are internally-oriented-a
negotiator attributes her failure in getting a good deal to her own
inadequacies as a bargainer or to her lack of preparation. Often, however, we
focus our attributions on others. A negotiator explains her poor outcome by
focusing on the other side's intentional actions (e.g., "they tricked me") or
16 1
the circumstances (e.g., "there wasn't enough time to negotiate properly").
Sometimes, of course, one's attributions about others are correct-the
other person is trying to trick you. Often, however, our attributions are
inaccurate and biased. Research has identified several such biases. The most
important is the fundamental attribution error, which refers to the tendency to
overestimate the importance of disposition and underestimate the ways in
procedure for international and other negotiations).
159

The transformational mediation literature has elevated this aspect of mediation to

primary importance. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE

OF MEDIATION 79 (1994). Although I do not place quite that much importance on this
aspect of a mediator's role, I do think that relationship-management can be beneficial in
the business context as well as in litigation. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 75, at 252-53
("[N]egotiation is a laboratory for the construction of relationships between business
actors.").
160 For an excellent overview of attribution theory and its relation to conflict, see
Keith G. Allred, Accusations and Anger: The Role of Attributions in Conflict and
Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 236
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000).
161 See Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of

Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 655, 660 (1980-81) (reviewing literature on early
attribution theory).
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which another's actions were caused by circumstance. 162 For example, when
a person cuts you off in traffic you are more likely to think "they are driving
that way because they are inconsiderate" than "they may be driving that way
because they are late to their child's medical appointment." In addition, we
tend to display the "actor-observer bias," which refers to a person's tendency
to over-attribute his own behavior to circumstance rather than to his own
habits or disposition. 163 In short, we hold others to an overly high standard
64
while simultaneously letting ourselves off too easily.1
In conflict situations, our interpretations can also be biased by the way
we "punctuate," and thus explain, a series of events. As Thompson and
Nadler explain:
Actor A perceives the history of conflict with another actor, B, as a
sequence of B-A, B-A, B-A, in which the initial hostile or aggressive move
was always made by B, obliging A to engage in defensive and legitimate
retaliatory action. Actor B punctuates the same history of interaction as AB, A-B, A-B, however, reversing the roles of aggressor and
defender .... When each side.., is queried, they explain their frustrations
165
and actions as defenses against the acts of the other party.

This "biased punctuation of conflict" means that each side may believe that
the other is responsible for any tensions in a negotiation, and each feels
justified in "retaliating" or escalating.
These attributions come with attendant emotions. In particular, if you
attribute the cause of your failure to another's intentional harmful actions,
you are most likely to become angry and seek retaliation. This is not a trivial
problem. Research has shown that angered negotiators tend to pay less
attention to each others' interests and to find fewer mutually-beneficial
solutions than those who are not angry. 166 Anger leads to a desire to
162 See Allred, supra note 160, at 240 ("Research indicates that when people err in
attributing other people's behavior, they do so on the side of inferring too quickly and
easily that a given behavior is the result of disposition while largely ignoring information
indicating that circumstances cause the behavior.").
163 See id. at 240-41 (describing actor-observer bias).
164 Alfred et al. have shown that the fundamental attribution error and the actorobserver bias can lead to both an "accuser bias" (a tendency for an actor harmed by
another's actions to assume that those actions were under that actor's control) and a "bias
of the accused" (a tendency to assume that one's own harmful behavior was caused by
circumstance rather than factors within one's control). See id. at 244 (reviewing study).
165 Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and
How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 213, 217 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000).
166 See Allred, supra note 160, at 244; see also Keith G. Allred et al., The Influence
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retaliate-to try to get the best deal possible for oneself or damage the other
side rather than working collaboratively. 167 This, in turn, provides the other
side with new evidence that its counterpart is untrustworthy and
opportunistic. Each side "reacts" to the other, and as misattributions and
emotions pile up, parties may become increasingly guarded, adversarial, and
untrusting. This hampers efforts to negotiate a deal.
It is not easy for parties to pull themselves out of this destructive cycle. If
one's anger is grounded in mis-attributions about others, circumstance, or
causation, simply venting that emotion or taking time to "cool off' is
unlikely to be productive and can instead make matters worse. 16 8 Instead,
negotiators must unpack the series of attributions and judgments that gave
rise to their emotions. By empathetically taking the other person's point of
view and attempting to tell the story of what happened from their
perspective, a negotiator can test her attributions and unravel those that are
unfounded. 169 This is often difficult to do. Once saddled with their respective
attributions and attendant emotions, two negotiators may be unable to step
out of their own shoes and into each other's.
2. Attributions and Emotions in Transactions
Like disputes, transactional negotiations are certainly not immune from
emotions and attributions. Tempers flare, accusations are made, and
relationships sour. Mergers and acquisitions, for example, can give rise to
intense emotional disagreements that put great strain on the underlying
business relationships. 170 As Robert Kindler, an M&A partner at Cravath,
of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance, 70 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 175, 183 (1997) ("Negotiators who held each other more
responsible for negative behavior felt more negative emotional regard for each other...
which led to less regard for the other party's interests... which led to less accurate
judgments of each other's interests . .. which lead to fewer joint gains .... ").
167 See Joseph P.. Daly, The Effects of Anger on Negotiations over Mergers and
Acquisitions, 7 NEGOT. J. 31, 35 (1991) (reporting the M&A players sometimes wanted
merely to "teach them a lesson" rather than optimize deal terms).
168 See, e.g., Keith G. Allred, Anger and Retaliation: Toward an Understandingof
Impassioned Conflict

in

Organizations, in

7

RESEARCH

ON

NEGOTIATION

IN

ORGANIZATIONS 27 (R.J. Bies et al., eds. 1999) (describing the problems with venting);
Robert S. Adler et al., Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger, 14
NEGOT. J. 161, 171 (1998) ("What is needed, instead, is time spent.., reassessing the

situation.
169 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 46-47 (describing importance of empathy
and perspective-taking); Allred, supra note 168.

170 See Daly, supra note 167, at 35 (reviewing interviews with participants in M&A
negotiations and discussing the role of anger).
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Swaine & Moore has said, "Even transactions that make absolute economic
sense do not happen unless the social issues work." 17 1 Particularly if one
party is more accustomed to negotiations than another or more sophisticated
with doing deals in a particular context, transacting parties may spend a great
deal of time and energy on these relational issues.
Consider the example of recent merger negotiations between SmithKline
Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome. In February 1998, a deal was announced that
promised to create a pharmaceutical giant with annual sales of $25 billion.
The combination was much applauded by industry and Wall Street
analysts. 172 Nevertheless, three weeks into the merger negotiations, the
companies' CEOs managed to kill the deal. In essence, Sir Richard Sykes,
the CEO of Glaxo, put an ultimatum offer to Jan Leschley, the CEO of
SmithKline that effectively removed Leschley and SmithKline from the
management structure of the new entity. Leschley walked, incensed at Sykes'
audacity. The next day, the combined market valuation of the two companies
dropped by $19 billion, destroying the significant run-up each had enjoyed as
a result of the disclosure of merger negotiations. Although several months
later Sykes hinted that he was willing to renew discussions, 173 Leschley
signaled that he was uninterested. Despite calls from the investment
community to overcome their differences, the Glaxo SmithKline deal
remained off the table until September of 1999, when Leschley announced
his decision to retire and Jean-Pierre Gamier was named as his successor at
SmithKline. Negotiations began again in earnest, and in January 2000, the
merger was re-announced. It was ultimately completed on December 27,
2000, creating GlaxoSmithKline. Ironically, neither of the original CEOs
controls the new entity: Leschley plays no part, Sykes plays the diminished
174
role of non-executive Chairman, and Gamier is CEO.
The GlaxoSmithKline example illustrates that negotiation breakdowns
occur in transactional bargaining, sometimes to the detriment of both parties.
To some extent, agents such as investment bankers and lawyers already serve
to mediate emotional conflicts during mergers, acquisitions, and other
transactions. One interview-based study, for example, found that:

171 BRAMs & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 126 (quoting Kindler).
172 See The UK Drugs Champion, FIN. TIMEs Feb. 2, 1998, at 17 ("There is no
shortage of superlatives to apply to the proposed merger between Glaxo Wellcome and

SmithKline Beecham.").
173 See Daniel Green, Glaxo Still Willing on SB Merger, FIN.TIMES, Apr. 4, 1998, at
19.
174 See David Pilling, Tonic for the Troops: Man in the News Jean-PierreGamier,
F N. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, at 15.
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[I]nvestment bankers ... credit intermediaries [such as themselves] with
preventing anger from killing a deal. [They] claimed that by keeping the
parties physically separated at times, serving as communication channels,
and filtering out relationship-threatening messages, intermediaries are able
to consummate deals that would not have taken place had the parties
17 5
negotiated face-to-face.

Moreover, game theory has long suggested that repeat play may help to
stimulate and stabilize cooperation. 176 Although few parties litigate against
one another more than once, lawyers do sometimes oppose each other
repeatedly. Attorneys may thus turn a one-shot game into an iterative one,
suggesting the possibility of increased cooperation. 177 Recent empirical work
indicates that this may in fact hold true in legal disputes. 17 8 Similarly,
transactional agents may have incentives to build a reputation for "getting the
deal done."' 179 Even if their principals have not worked together before
(which may be more likely than in the litigation context), the agents may
have a sufficiently-established relationship to overcome mis-attributions and
emotions.
A neutral sometimes has an advantage over an agent in this regard,
however. 180 An agent can fall prey to the same attribution errors as her
principal. In discussions with a client, a lawyer, real estate agent, or banker
may try to mollify the client rather than test the client's perhaps biased story
about the other side. In the worst-case scenario, an agent may fan the flames
and aggravate a client's emotions. But even without trying to escalate a
175 Daly, supra note 167, at 37; see also Alan K. Wells, Acquisition Intermediaries:
Purveyors of Opportunity, in DIRECTORY OF M&A INTERMEDIARIES 13, 14 (2001)

("Intermediaries will often... mediate emotionally charged negotiations to insure that
the deal is closed in a reasonable amount of time.").
176 See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
177 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509

(1994).
178 See Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit
Cooperation?Evidence from FederalCivil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 59 (2002).

179 See Scott, supra note 99 (discussing the importance of reputation in contracting).
180 See BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 206-07 (2000)

(exploring how mediators help parties manage emotions); DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 287 (Douglas H. Yam ed., 1999) ("Hostility, anger, and other emotions
often impede productive discussion on substantive issues in dispute. A mediator may use
a variety of techniques to manage destructive emotions and reconcile the disputants.");
Allred, supra note 160, at 250 ("The mediator can help the accuser take the perspective
of the accused for. the purpose of taking stock of those mitigating factors beyond the
control of the accused.").
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conflict, an agent may naturally take his client's perspective as given and
discount the likelihood that the other side has a valid interpretation of events
or more benign intentions than the client understands.
A neutral positioned between two parties can often help them to gain
such perspective. As discussed above, anger is often driven by misattributions about another person's motivations. In strategic situations it is
easy to assume that when the other bargainer "starts high" or "holds out,"
they do so because they intend to harm you or to treat you unfairly.
Bargainers are less likely to attribute such actions to the exigencies of
circumstance. By screening some overly opportunistic offers and at times
sending fuzzy rather than clear information between the parties, a mediator
can blunt such emotions and thereby keep the negotiations on track. 18 1 Over
time, avoiding emotional disagreements may help the parties to establish
trust.
This not only leads to more amiable negotiations, but also has serious
substantive benefits. As mentioned above, if the parties trust each other they
may be better positioned to find value-creating solutions to their substantive
differences. They may be able to rely more on informal agreements rather
than contractual obligations 182 and may be more flexible in the face of
unexpected bumps in the road. Perhaps most importantly, they may avoid the
destructive cycle of mis-attributions that can lead parties to "blow up" a deal
or reach a Pareto-inefficient agreement.
IV. PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE OF TRANSACTIONAL MEDIATION
Parts HI and III made the case that mediators can add value in
transactions. In particular, I argued that mediators can manage information
exchange to overcome adverse selection, at least in transactions that take on
bilateral monopoly characteristics. I further suggested that this may be
especially true of legal negotiations over contractual terms and conditions,
which may often take on such characteristics.
181 See LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 35, at 174 (discussing this role for a mediator);
see also Debra A. Gilin & Paul W. Paese, Mediation as Persuasion: Central Route
Attribution Change as a Conflict Resolution Technique (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (reporting study showing that mediation intervention helped conflicting
parties unravel attributions and de-escalate emotions).
182 Fuller suggested that a mediator can help parties to shift their relationship from
one based on rights and duties to one based on trust, cooperation, and reciprocity. This,
he argued, can "enable them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal
prescriptions laid down in advance." Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms and Functions,
44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 326 (1971). In other words, parties can come to rely on trust and
respect rather than on contractual obligation.
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Given these potential benefits, the most obvious objection to the
argument laid out so far is economic and empirical: if mediators could be so
helpful in transactions, there should already be a market for their services.
Social and economic roles that create value evolve into robust institutions;
those that do not fail to thrive. As already discussed, to date there has been
little evidence that mediators are serving in transactions. This suggests prima
facie that the market does not need mediator assistance in contract formation.
It is extremely difficult to know whether, how, and how often mediators
currently serve in transactional bargaining. As indicated, almost no research
has been conducted in this area. Nevertheless, we do know that mediators are
involved in some pre-closing negotiations over contract formation. As
already noted, the most common example is collective bargaining. Whether
mediators intervene in other sorts of transactions, however, is something of a
mystery.
On the one hand, the lack of discussion or promotion of transactional
intervention by the mediation community may suggest that few are doing
such work. With the exception of one practitioner's article arguing for
transactional mediation in the international context, 183 few mediators seem to
discuss or even be aware of this possibility. As one might expect, the major
associations of mediators are singularly dispute focused. Review of the
committees, sections, and workshop topics of the Association for Conflict
Resolution-one of the largest groups of mediators and dispute resolution
professionals in the United States-shows no interest in transactional
mediation. Its Internet site defines ADR as "a wide range of processes that
encourage nonviolent dispute resolution outside of the traditional court
system," and its discussion of the benefits of mediation focuses on its
184
efficiencies as compared to litigation.
The same is true of the American Bar Association's Section on Dispute
185
Resolution, which was established in 1993 and has over 7,500 members.
The Section publishes a Guide to Dispute Resolution Processes, meant to be
an introduction for attorneys to the field of ADR and mediation. The Guide
describes such processes as "alternatives to having a state or federal judge or
jury decide the dispute in a trial," 186 again suggesting that the Section is
focused on resolving litigated disputes. In addition, the Section publishes the
183 See L. Michael Hager & Robert Pritchard, Deal Mediation: How ADR
Techniques Can Help Achieve Durable Agreements in the Global Markets, 14 ICSID
REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 2-3 (1999).
184 See http://www.acresolution.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
185 See http://www.abanet.org/dispute/home.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
186 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WHAT You NEED TO KNow ABOUT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION:

THE

GUIDE

TO

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION

PROCESSES,

available at

http://www.abanet.org/dispute/draftbrochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators. This too focuses on disputes,
defining mediation as a "process in which an impartial third party-a
mediator-facilitates [the resolution of a dispute by promoting] voluntary
1 87
agreement (or 'self-determination') by the parties to the dispute."'
Although one might interpret "dispute" broadly in this definition in order to
include transactional intervention, 188 it seems unlikely that this was the
Section's intention.
Finally, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution in New York, which
has played a major role in bringing mediation and other forms of dispute
resolution to the corporate sector, is litigation oriented. Although the Institute
has sponsored some discussion of transactional ADR, 189 the vast majority of
its resources and publications focus on mediation and arbitration in the
litigation context. Similarly, major ADR training organizations have largely
190
ignored transactional issues.
On the other hand, my own survey of 122 practicing mediators unearthed
forty-eight who claimed to have served as a transactional mediator. This
survey was designed simply to trawl for mediators in hopes of determining
whether dispute mediators were also being hired in the transactional
context. 19 1 The survey asked respondents for information about their
education and training, their experience as a dispute mediator, and their
experience as a transactional mediator. 19 2 In the section on transactional
187 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

MODEL STANDARDS

OF CONDUCT FOR

MEDIATORS, available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/dispute/modstan.txt (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003).
188 See infra notes 227-36 and accompanying text.
189 See CPR's Online Seminar: Transactional ADR, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COSTS OF L1TIG. 173 (July-Aug. 2001) (transcript of panel discussion on the possibilities
of transactional mediation).
190 For example, the web site for CDR Associates in Boulder, Colorado-a national
mediation and training organization-similarly focuses on the resolution of litigation. See
http://www.mediate.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
191 1 recognize that some professionals who do not self-identify as mediators or who
do not belong to recognized mediation associations may nevertheless be serving as
mediators in transactions. However, I had no way to identify or contact such people. As a
result, I focused the survey on existing dispute mediators in hopes of identifying whether
any such mediators also worked in the transactional arena.
192 To distinguish transactional from dispute mediation I asked the following
question:
Have you ever served as a mediator in a transaction as opposed to in a dispute?
(By this I mean helping two transacting parties to negotiate their contract or deal
agreement in advance of the deal taking place. It does NOT include mediating a dispute
that arises after a transaction or as a result of a contract. For example, transactional
mediation would include helping a buyer and seller complete the sale of a home or
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work it asked how often the respondent had engaged in transactional
mediation and allowed the respondent to indicate in how many of various
types of transactions he or she had intervened. 193 The survey then asked the
respondent to describe the largest (in dollars) transaction they had worked
on, and to indicate what sorts of functions they fulfilled in that mediation. 194
I posted the survey on a web site and emailed over five hundred
mediators, inviting them to fill out the survey on-line. I make no claim that
the sample was random or representative of all practicing mediators-lacking
any systematic and efficient way to contact large numbers of mediators, I
simply searched leading mediation-related Internet sites for email addresses.
After reviewing the results, I eliminated any respondents whose responses
suggested confusion about the survey or the definition of transactional
mediation, and contacted some of those who indicated that they had served as
a transactional mediator to verify the information provided and clarify that
the respondent was indeed reporting the type of mediation I was focused
upon. This weeded out false positives.
The survey results are intriguing. Over forty mediators claimed to have
been involved in a transactional mediation. They indicated that they had
served as mediators in various types of transactions, including residential real
estate, commercial real estate, business formation, mergers and acquisitions,
joint ventures, and both union and non-union employment agreement
business, but would not include resolving litigation that arose after the sale of the house
or business.)
In retrospect, the definition may have been too narrow: it suggests that interventions
in the renegotiation stage are excluded. Focusing this initial survey primarily on preclosing negotiations served my purposes here, however, as I was most curious about
whether I would find any such transactional mediator interventions.
193 The types included: union/labor management contract formation, non-union
employment agreement formation, residential real estate transaction, commercial real
estate transaction, sale of a small business (under $5 million), merger of two businesses,
sale of a major business or business unit (over $5 million), formation of a business or
partnership, creation of a joint venture between two or more businesses, other.
194 The list of functions included: introducing the parties to each other (serving as a
matchmaker); comparing offers and counteroffers to see if a deal was possible; shuttling
information back and forth between the parties; helping the parties find creative solutions
or trades; proposing creative solutions or trades that the parties had not thought of;
helping the parties agree on legal language to include in their contract; proposing legal
language that the parties had not thought of; helping manage the process by setting an
agenda, timekeeping, etc.; helping the parties overcome strong emotions, anger, etc.;
interviewing each party privately about their interests, needs, priorities; providing an
independent assessment of the value of the transaction; helping to verify important
information about the deal; helping the parties plan for future disputes (such as by
including a dispute resolution clause in their contract); serving as a mediator after the
deal was closed to resolve ongoing or future disputes between the parties); and others.
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negotiations. 195 Examples included assisting with negotiations over the
formation of a partnership of practicing physicians, the sale of a motorcycle
dealership, the formation of pre-nuptial agreements and domestic
partnerships, re-allocation of property rights and governance in a golfing
community, the establishment of a joint venture between a small business
and a Fortune 500 company, the sale of cable television access rights,
formation of a cross-country ski league, the creation of a houseboat
community association, the creation of a joint venture to produce software,
negotiations over the terms of a real estate brokerage contract, the transfer of
control within a closely held software development firm, the formation of a
partnership to own an airplane (where the parties needed to work out issues
as varied as fees and the placement of stickers on the tail fin), the negotiation
of angel funding for a privately held business, and mergers between two or
more corporations. These transactions ranged in value from $100,000 to $26
million.
None seemed to make transactional mediation their primary practice. Of
the forty-eight respondents who had conducted a transactional mediation,
twenty-seven had done ten or fewer such interventions, and of those, twelve
had done only one or two. Although only thirty-one respondents (of these
forty-eight) provided sufficient information to draw a comparison between
how many dispute mediations and how many transactional interventions they
had done, of those who did give such information, it seemed clear that
transactional work was a small fraction (average 6.14%) of their portfolio of
mediations. 196 These thirty-one respondents had each conducted an average
of 409 total mediations (maximum 1,500, minimum 50, standard deviation
344), and an average of only 12 transactional mediations (maximum 67,
minimum 1, standard deviation 13).197
195 I expected that many respondents would report experience with labormanagement negotiations and that this might bias the results. In fact, only one of the 48
respondents with transactional experience was solely a labor-management mediator.
Twelve others had some labor-management experience but also reported experience with
others types of transactional intervention.
196 These respondents obviously distinguished between the many dispute cases they
had mediated and the few transactional mediations in which they had participated. This
suggests that they understood the distinction I was trying to draw in the survey.
197 The mediators in the survey with transactional experience had practiced
mediation slightly longer (average 12 years mediation experience) than their peers in the
survey who had not (average 8 years mediation experience). In addition, 108 respondents
gave information on whether they were licensed as attorneys and/or were currently
practicing as attorneys. Of the 44 transactional mediators that gave such information,
only 10 (or 23%) were not attorneys. Of the 64 respondents who gave such information
and who had had no involvement in transactional mediation, 31 (or 48%) were not
attorneys. This supports-although it obviously does not prove-my contention that a

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 19:2 20041

These results suggest that mediators do intervene occasionally in
transactions pre-closing. Although I place no stock in the fact that such a
high percentage of those surveyed had done so (because the sample was not
random), I had initially set out merely to find whether any such interventions
are occurring. The survey at least indicates that mediators are sometimes
asked to facilitate transactions.
Whether mediators are currently involved in transactions to a greater
extent than suggested here is obviously an empirical question deserving
additional study. The publication of this Article may help to bring forward
dispute mediators and others currently working in this capacity. These
preliminary results suggest that some mediators are working in transactions
but that it is not a widespread practice. Nevertheless, the results strengthen
both the case for transactional mediators and the need for more coherent
understanding and regulation of their practice. Part V now turns to the latter
issue.
V. IMPLICATIONS

In February 2002, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates
approved the Ethics 2000 Committee's proposed revisions to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Included in that revision is a new Rule 2.4
governing lawyers serving as mediators. Although Rule 2.4 was originally
drafted only to cover mediators serving in disputes, 19 8 the Rule as adopted
clearly extends to transactional mediation. The text of the rule defines a
mediator, stating that "[a] lawyer serves as a third-party [mediator] when the
lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach
a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them." 199
The Rule's Comments are more explicit. Comment 1 to Proposed Rule 2.4
states that "[a] third-party [mediator] is a person, such as a mediator,
arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or
unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a

lawyer may have special advantages in this sort of intervention.
198 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4(a) (Proposed Rule 1999) (on file

with author).
A lawyer serves as a third-party [mediator] when the lawyer assists two or
more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of disputes that
have arisen between them. Service as a third-party [mediator] may include service as
an arbitrator... [or] a mediator... , or in such other capacity as will enable the
lawyer impartially to assist the parties to resolve their dispute.
Id. (emphasis added).
199 Id. (emphasis added).
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transaction."20 0 In choosing this broad definition of mediation, the drafters

apparently assumed that a lawyer-mediator could play some useful role in
20 1
dealmaking.
I certainly applaud this progressive definition in Rule 2.4. As Parts II and
M indicated, lawyers may have special advantages as transactional mediators
in some contexts, and therefore it is appropriate that the Model Rules account
for such mediation. Nevertheless, the Rule is in many ways emblematic of
the current confused regulatory stance toward transactional mediators. The
inclusion of transactional mediators within the Rule's scope was apparently
quite accidental. 20 2 The Committee never discussed this aspect of the Rule in
any depth, 203 nor debated the merits or implications of transactional
mediators. In short, the Committee got lucky on this issue.
A similar lack of analysis is evident in other regulations that impact the
use of transactional mediators, and the results have not always been so
propitious. In this Part, I make use of the conclusions in Parts II and I1 and
the findings in Part IV to argue for reform of such regulations. Some rules
currently inhibit transactional mediator practice in areas in which it would
200 Id. (Comment 1) (emphasis added).
201 See Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics
2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Considerationsfor Adoption
and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REv. 207, 229-30 (2001) (reviewing the Committee's
work and asserting, as a Committee member, that "[b]y including the resolution of 'other
matters' as an appropriate subject for [mediator] assistance in its recommendation, the
Commission impliedly adopted a broader concept of ADR to include non-justiciable
disputes as well as legal disputes and transactional as well as disputational settings.").
202 It is not clear where this language in the Comment originated. See Telephone
Interview with Nancy J. Moore, Ethics 2000 Reporter (June 20, 2002). Most likely the
language was borrowed from a proposed rule submitted to the Ethics 2000 Reporter by
Professor Menkel-Meadow. Although the Menkel-Meadow draft rule did not survive, it
similarly covered transactional mediation. The Preamble of that draft rule stated that the
rule should apply "to the lawyer who acts as a mediator third-party, such as a mediator,
arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, to assist represented or unrepresented parties resolve
disputes or arrange transactions among each other." See CPR-Georgetown Comm. on
Ethics and Standards in ADR, Preamble to Proposed New Model Rule of Prof'I Conduct,
Rule 4.5 for the Lawyer Mediator (February 1999).
203 The minutes of the Ethics 2000 Committee show no extensive discussion of this
aspect of Rule 2.4. Although the transactional language appeared in the initial Comments
to the new Rule 2.4, the text of the rule was dispute oriented. The minutes of the Ethics
2000 Commission's September 15-17, 2000 meeting in Philadelphia show some
conversation in which a member noted that the Rule's Comments were inconsistent with
the language in the black letter rule. See Ethics 2000 Commission Minutes (September
15-17, 2000), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-09-15mtg.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2003). The rule was then conformed to the Comment, and the "or other matter" text
appeared in the November, 2000 public discussion draft of the Rule.
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make sense. Section A first argues that most existing state statutes granting a
privilege to mediation-related communications do not cover transactional
mediation. Similarly, the proposed Uniform Mediation Act does not seem to
apply to transactional mediation. This could serve as a barrier to the use of
transactional mediators in almost any context, and should be reformed. In
addition, Section A reviews the ways in which the broker-dealer registration
requirements in the securities regulations might inhibit the use of
transactional mediators in mergers and acquisitions. As Part HII indicated,
M&A is characterized by complex contracting in situations that could easily
become strategic. As a result, it is ripe for transactional mediator
intervention. I therefore argue that this area similarly requires reform.
Finally, Section B considers implications for practitioners. It focuses on
various practical barriers that may prevent dealmakers from looking to
transactional mediators, and suggests ways to overcome such barriers. I
conclude by considering whether lawyers should be obligated to discuss
transactional mediation with contracting clients.
A. Regulatory Implications
1. Mediation ConfidentialityStatutes
There is certainly debate over whether information communicated during
a mediation should be privileged from future discovery. Although parties can
obviously contract with a mediator to keep information confidential, such
contracts cannot shield the mediator from being forced to testify or divulge
information if later subpoenaed. Many have argued that without a statutory
privilege, parties will neither use mediation nor communicate openly to a
mediator during mediation. 20 4 Others have questioned this claim, attacking
mediation privileges as designed to seal mediators from suit or critique. 20 5
204 See Ellen E. Deason, PredictableMediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal

System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 239, 247 (2002) [hereinafter Deason, Predictable
Mediation Confidentiality] (noting that confidentiality is "crucial" for mediation); Ellen
E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency

or Crucial Predictability?,85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 82 (2001) (arguing that confidentiality
may be a "precondition for any discussion" in some disputes and that it reduces the
"chilling potential of disclosures"); Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR
Proceedings:Policy Issues Arisingfrom the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 541,

543 (1997) (noting that "the independence of the third-party neutral may be undermined
if she were required to testify at some future time about what was said at the ADR
proceeding"); see also NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9thCir. 1980) (arguing that
the "complete exclusion of mediator testimony is necessary" to further mediation); Folb
v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (arguing that "[r]efusing to establish a privilege to protect confidential
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Without entering this debate in depth, I generally believe that a
mediation privilege is necessary to ensure that a party feels secure that
information disclosed in confidence to a mediator will not later be discovered
by the other party or an outsider. In the litigation context, parties may
otherwise fear that such information will be used against them in court if the
mediation fails to produce a settlement. In transactions, both parties may fear
future litigation (by the other side, shareholders, or competitors) and may
thus be similarly reluctant to disclose openly to a mediator. This will dampen
information exchange and may prevent the parties from reaching the best
deal possible.
Assuming that a privilege is justified and valuable, could transactional
mediators avail themselves of existing or proposed mediation privilege
statutes? Put differently, if two transacting parties were considering hiring a
mediator to facilitate their contract, could that mediator guarantee them that
mediated communications could be kept confidential in the face of future
discovery attempts?
Others have documented the bewildering variety of state and federal
20 6
approaches to shielding mediation communications from future discovery.
Many states have no statute governing mediation confidentiality. Of the
states that have enacted regulations, some have a comprehensive statute
protecting all types of mediations, while others grant confidentiality only to
designated mediation programs such as family or small-claims mediation.
This makes it difficult for parties or mediators to predict whether their
communications will be subject to future discovery, and thus presents a
20 7
barrier to adopting mediation.
Without reviewing all of the varied state statutory frameworks in this
area-something that is both beyond the scope of this Article and without
communications in mediation proceedings creates an incentive for participants to
withhold sensitive information in mediation or refuse to participate at all").
205 See Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1986) (arguing that "a blanket mediation privilege rests on faulty
logic, inadequate data, and short-sighted professional self-interest"); Scott H. Hughes,
The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 72
(2001) (arguing that a broad confidentiality privilege can undermine the principle of selfdetermination by limiting the information available to the parties and by concealing a
mediator's negligence); J. Brad Reich, A Callfor IntellectualHonesty: A Response to the
Uniform Mediation Act's Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 197, 19899 (2001) (arguing against the need for a privilege).
206 See

3

SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE passim (2d

ed. 1994) (reviewing state laws).
207 See Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality, supra note 204, at 247
("Current law is a long way from permitting parties to anticipate, even roughly, the
degree of confidentiality they can count on in mediation.").
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purpose, given existing reviews in the literature-this section briefly
examines existing state regulations and the newly-adopted Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA) from the perspective of transactional mediators. It
argues that neither most existing regulations nor the new UMA extend
sufficiently clear confidentiality protections to transactional mediation to
foster mediator intervention in deals. 20 8 As a result, this regulatory regime
may inhibit the development of transactional mediators.
a. Existing State Mediation Statutes
Roughly half of the states have some sort of mediation statute or
regulation addressing confidentiality protections. Of those, the majority only
provides confidentiality in specified mediation contexts such as family
disputes, labor-management litigation, or community dispute resolution
centers. 20 9 In no case would these context-specific provisions offer
confidentiality protection for a transactional mediation.
In those states that have passed a general mediation confidentiality
statute, there is obviously a greater chance that transactional mediation might
be protected. Unfortunately, however, even those states with broad mediation
statutes generally employ language limiting protected mediations to those
resolving litigation. Connecticut, for example, defines mediation as a process
"in which a person not affiliated with either party to a lawsuit facilitates
communications between such parties. '' 210 Texas similarly provides
confidentiality for communications made in any "alternative dispute
resolution procedure," 2 11 but limits its privilege to those portions of a
mediation related to a civil or criminal dispute. 2 12
208 Similarly, evidentiary protections, such as Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, do not extend to non-litigation contexts. Rule 408 provides that
evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability or for invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible."
FED. R.EviD. 408.
209 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-381.16 (2000) (mediation in marital and
domestic proceedings); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-204 (Michie 1996) (mediation in labor
context); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9503 (2001) (victim-offender mediation); FLA. STAT.
§ 44.201 (2001) (community dispute settlement centers); IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13 (1995
& Supp. 2002) (collective bargaining in education); see also 1 COLE ET AL., supra note
206, § 9:12 & 3 app. A (reviewing state mediation statutes).
210 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-235d (Supp. 2003).
211 TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (Vernon 1997 & Supp.2003).
212 Id.; see also 3 COLE ET AL., supra note 206, § 9:12 (discussing statute).
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A few existing state statutes are potentially broad enough to cover
transactional mediation. Utah extends privilege to "any information obtained
2 13
in the course of an ADR proceeding" without defining "ADR proceeding."
This leaves open the possibility of a broad interpretation. Other statutes are
less clear, but could potentially be used by a transactional mediator.
Wyoming, for example, defines mediation as "a process in which an
impartial third person facilitates communication between two (2) or more
parties in conflict to promote reconciliation, settlement, compromise or
understanding." 2 14 The same statute defines a mediator as "an impartial third
person not involved in the conflict, dispute or situation who engages in
mediation." 2 15 This seems broad enough to cover transactions. Similarly,
Virginia defines mediation as "a process in which a mediator assists and
facilitates two or more parties to a controversy in reaching a mutually
acceptable resolution of the controversy." 2 16 The word "controversy" could
be interpreted more broadly than "dispute," particularly given that these
2 17
statutes seem focused on party self-determination.
As a general matter, however, a transactional mediator working under
existing law would have an uphill battle to squeeze such mediation within the
various statutory grants of confidentiality protection. Both parties and the
mediator would face a great deal of uncertainty about whether their
communications would in fact be privileged. This uncertainty might deter
potential parties and mediators from attempting to use a mediator in a
transaction.
b. The Uniform MediationAct
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
a committee of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution have recently
completed drafting the Uniform Mediation Act, which is beginning to
percolate to the states for adoption. 218 The UMA project was initiated to
2 13

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-8(4) (2002).
214 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-101(ii) (Michie 2003).
215 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-101(iii) (Michie 2003) (emphasis added). The statute
similarly defines a "party to a mediation" as "a person who is involved in the conflict,
dispute or situation." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-101(iv) (Michie 2003).
216 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.21 (Michie 2000).

217 Minnesota takes a similar approach. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02(la) (2000)
(making communication "pursuant to an ... agreement to mediate" confidential). Section
572.33(3) defines an "agreement to mediate" as "a written agreement which identifies a
controversy between the parties to the agreement." MINN. STAT. § 572.33(3) (2000).
218 The Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in August 2001 and by the American Bar Association in February
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bring coherence to the various ways in which states have chosen to regulate
2 19
mediation.
It is unclear whether transactional mediation falls within the scope of the
UMA. The final Act defines mediation as "a process in which a mediator
facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in
reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." 220 Although this
suggests that the Act's protections are limited to "disputes," the UMA does
not define "dispute," leaving unclear whether the Act could be interpreted so
broadly as to include the work of a mediator in a transaction (where the
mediator was helping the parties to overcome their disagreements, but was
not involved in formal litigation in any sense).
The Act's scope provision is similarly confusing. The Act can be
triggered in three ways: if a dispute is referred to mediation by a court,
agency, or arbitrator 22 1; if "the mediation parties and the mediator agree to
mediate in a record that demonstrates an expectation that mediation
communications will be privileged against disclosure" 222 ; or if "the
mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or
herself out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by a person that holds
itself out as providing mediation." 223 The two latter provisions suggest that
parties can opt in to the Act's provisions either through explicit contract or
by hiring a person who self-identifies as a mediator. The Reporter's Notes
224
indicate that the Act is meant to be "broad in its coverage of mediation,"
and that the "central operating principle" governing scope is the honoring of
the parties' reasonable expectations about whether their interaction is
covered by the Act.2 2 5 Nevertheless, these scope provisions rely upon the
Act's foundational definition of "mediation." Put differently, they apply only
to "mediations" under the Act's definition, which is, again, based on the
226
word "dispute."
2002. As of Summer 2002, the UMA had been introduced in legislation in New York,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Vermont. See http://www.nccusl.org/
nccusl/pubndrafts.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
219 The UMA provides both parties and mediators with a privilege to refuse to
disclose mediation communications in civil or administrative proceedings. See UNIF.
MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2003).
220
UNIF.MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2003).
221 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(a)(1) (2003) (describing the scope of the Act).
222 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(A)(2) (2003).
223 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(A)(3) (2003).
224

UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3, reporter's note 1 (2003).

225 Id.

226 It seems that the drafters' understanding is that the UMA would not apply to
mediators assisting with a transaction. Discussions with Richard Reuben, Reporter of the
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Extending the UMA to transactional mediators would thus depend upon
a broad reading of the word "dispute" in the Act's definition of mediation.
What is a dispute? A narrow interpretation would limit "disputes" to
litigation-those disputes involving contested legal rights or part of a formal
adjudicative process. A broad interpretation would incorporate all
disagreements or differences of opinion. Black's Law Dictionary illustrates
the definitional problem. On the one hand, Black's defines "dispute" broadly
as a "conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a
right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on
the other." On the other hand, Black also lists a more narrow, litigationfocused definition: dispute as "[t]he subject of litigation; the matter for which
a suit is brought and upon which issue is2joined,
and in relation to which
7
2
examined."
witnesses
and
jurors are called
It seems most likely that were a transactional mediator to claim privilege
under the UMA, a court would interpret the Act's use of the word "dispute"
narrowly to deny the privilege in this circumstance. First, the Act grew out of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution movement, which has traditionally
focused on settling litigation. 228 As discussed above, few have considered the
possibility of using mediators in transactions. 22 9 There is certainly no
consensus on a definition of "mediation," but almost all such definitions
incorporate the use of the word "dispute." 2 30 Given that the authors of such
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Drafting Committee in Cambridge, Mass. (Jan.,
2000); Telephone Interview (July, 2002).
227 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 424 (5th ed. 1979).
228 See Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics
2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerationsfor Adoption

and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REv. 207, 217-18 (2001) ("Dispute in the context of
using an alternative to litigation [as in ADR] implies a conflict that could be framed as a
legal dispute, meaning a dispute involving rights that could be granted or denied by a
court.").

229 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
230 Many definitions of mediation contain the words "dispute" or "disputants." See
JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK 1-2 (2000) (defining mediation as a

"process for resolving conflict" and as "a process in which a disinterested third
party... assists the disputants in reaching a voluntary settlement of their differences
through an agreement that defines their future behavior"); Kenneth Kressel, Mediation, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 522, 522 (Morton

Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) ("Mediation may be defined as a process in
which disputants attempt to resolve their differences with the assistance of an acceptable
third party."); Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Definitions-Introduction to the Terminology of
Dispute Avoidance and Resolution, 1998, at 1 (defining "mediation" as "[a] process that
calls for parties to work together with the aid of a mediator facilitator who assists them in
reaching a settlement. The mediator's role is advisory and resolution of the dispute rests
with the parties themselves").

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 19:2 2004]

definitions then discuss mediation as a form of litigation settlement, it is a
stretch to claim that in the ADR field "dispute" actually signifies "litigation
and transactions."
Second, although its definitions are broad, the LUMA is primarily
concerned with the use of mediation as an alternative to litigation. Various
other provisions address concerns specifically related to the settlement of
litigation; none address transactional mediation. 23 1 This suggests that the Act
was designed to cover only the former.
Third, had the UMA's drafters wanted to extend the Act to cover
transactional mediation, they could easily have followed the lead set by the
drafters of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct and included the
word "transactions" in their definitional section. 232 Given that the definition
in the proposed Model Rule 2.4 was available to the UMA's drafting
committee, a court might infer that the UMA's drafters did not want to
extend the privilege to transactional interventions.
Fourth, courts interpreting contractual agreements to arbitrate all
"disputes" have often assumed that the word refers to claims that could be
litigated. That the parties have a bona fide disagreement may not mean that
they have a "dispute" in the legal sense. 233 Courts have held that whether a
dispute exists turns on whether a matter of fact or law has been asserted by

231 See, e.g., UNF. MEDIATION ACT § 7(a) (2003) ("[A] mediator may not make a
report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication
regarding a mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make
a ruling on the dispute that is the subject of the mediation.").
232 See supra notes 200-01and accompanying text. Alternately, the UMA could
have incorporated a word more broad than "dispute" without referencing transactions.
"Differences," for example, is more broad, incorporating within it almost any type of
disagreement or dispute. See, e.g., Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Flair Builders, Inc.,
406 U.S. 487, 491 (1972) (holding that the term "any difference" in an arbitration
agreement was broad and covered all types of disputes). This might, however, open the
doors to the UMA too widely.
233 Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat's essay on the emergence of disputes similarly
suggests that although the word "disputing" refers to the entire process of grievance
formation, the word "dispute" refers to the end stages of the transformation of a simple
disagreement into litigation. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming... , 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
631, 635-36 (1981) (discussing progression through naming, blaming and claiming
stages as a dispute evolves).
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one side and denied by the other. 234 At least one court has held that a mere
2 35
assertion of rights is not a "dispute" in this sense.
Although one must refer to such arbitration cases by analogy, they
suggest that in the ADR context courts have interpreted the word "dispute" to
refer to litigated disagreements or to differences that present an issue that
could be legitimately litigated. Two parties in a transaction that hire a
mediator to facilitate their negotiations and to help them reach a more valuecreating solution might have difficulty meeting this standard. This suggests,
again, that the UMA would not shield transactional mediators.
If this interpretation is correct, the broad adoption of the UMA by the
states in the coming years could be a significant constraint on the possibility
of using transactional mediators. Although most current state law seems to
accord with the UMA in excluding transactional mediators from mediator
confidentiality statutes, 2 36 the UMA would narrow those existing laws that
might protect transactional mediation. Moreover, it would solidify the
assumption that mediation exists solely in the litigation domain. Even if this
interpretation of the UMA is incorrect, it raises sufficient doubts to deter
transacting parties from using a mediator. Uncertainty about the UMA's

234 See Cox v. Fremont County Pub. Bldg. Auth., 415 F.2d 882, 886 (10th Cir.
1969) (citing Gold Uranium Mining Co. v. Chain O'Mines Operators, 262 P.2d 927
(Colo. 1953)).
235 See Weinstock v. Weinstock, 240 A.D.2d 658, 658 (N.Y. 2d. 1997) (involving a
wife that asserted a claim for support and a husband that did not claim that he owed
support, and finding that there was no "dispute" under the arbitration clause and that she
was not required to arbitrate her claims and could instead bring them to court for
enforcement). Put differently, a court may decide as a matter of law that the parties'
disagreement does not rise to the level of a "dispute" within the contract's arbitration
clause. For example, in Hausner v. Hopewell Prods. Inc., 187 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1959), three partners established several stock corporations. Their agreement dictated
that in the event that one partner wanted to retire from the business, he would tender his
shares to the others. It also provided that in the event of a tender, the retiring director
would resign as a corporate officer and be discharged from all corporate duties. All
"disputes" were subject to arbitration. Litigation arose when one director offered to sell
his shares to his partners and they rejected his offer. They then insisted that he
nevertheless resign as an officer, interpreting "tender" to include rejected offers. He
disagreed, arguing that a tender occurred only if accepted. The court held that, although
"[u]ndoubtedly a difference of opinion exists between the parties as to the meaning of the
word 'tender' in the agreement," there was no need to send that disagreement to
arbitration. Id. at 408. According to the court, it would violate common sense and logic to
construe "tender" in this fashion. Therefore, the court held that "[t]here is no such dispute
existing in this regard which would justify permitting an arbitration board to pass upon
th[e interpretive] question." Id.
236 See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
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scope means that a mediator cannot guarantee the parties that their
communications will be kept confidential.
To reduce such uncertainty, states should modify their existing statutes
or their adoption of the Uniform Mediation Act to account for transactional
mediators. The most simple and uniform modification would borrow
language from the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.4.
Rather than adopting the UMA's definition of mediation as "a process in
which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties
237
to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute,"
the states could simply replace "dispute" with "dispute or other matter," per
Rule 2.4's approach. Like the new Rule 2.4, the comments to the state's
mediation privilege statute could then clarify that "other matter" included
238
transactional mediation.
2. Securities Regulations
In addition to uncertainties about privilege, a mediator seeking to
intervene in transactions faces uncertainties about certain substantive areas of
the law. This section explores whether a mediator intervening in the mergers
and acquisitions context would be required to register as a broker or
investment adviser under the securities laws, and the consequences of
uncertainty regarding this issue.
a. Broker-DealerRegistrationRequirements
Under section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a "broker"
is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others." 239 Although on its face the use of the word
"effecting" suggests that only agents with authority to close a transaction
would be implicated, the SEC has adopted a broad interpretation of
"effecting transactions." 240 Unfortunately, the SEC's approach to the
question of who must register as a broker has been neither uniform nor
entirely clear. In the typical brokerage situation in which a broker trades on a
customer's account, the issue is simple. Regulation is required to protect
confidence in the securities exchanges and the investment vehicle and to
237 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §2(1) (2003).

238 See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing the Model Rule 2.4
approach).
239 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2000).
•240 See John Polanin, Jr., The "Finder's" Exception From Federal Broker-Dealer
Registration,40 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 794 (1991).
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prevent brokers from misusing client funds. In atypical situations, however,
in which an agent-intermediary participates in securities-related activities
(such as some mergers) but is not necessarily trading or "effecting
transactions" per se, the section 3(a)(4) test becomes more difficult to apply.
The SEC has provided little guidance on the scope of 3(a)(4), and little
academic commentary has focused on the issue in the merger context.
As a general proposition, the SEC has held that if a distribution or
exchange of securities takes place, an agent-intermediary receives a
percentage commission, or the intermediary is involved in the parties'
negotiations, the intermediary must be registered as a broker-dealer. 24 1 The
intermediary need not have authority to close the transaction to be considered
a broker. The key factor seems to be whether the agent plays a significant
role in negotiating and closing the transaction, including whether the agent
2 42
offers advice on valuation or strategy.
This focus on negotiations, of course, might implicate a mediator. Given
that a mediator would be intimately involved in the negotiation and closing
of a merger or acquisition, that mediator's services might fall within the
scope of 3(a)(4).
To remove themselves from the SEC's reach, mediators could argue that
a mediator does not fall within 3(a)(4) because a mediator does not have
fiduciary duties to either party. A mediator could try to analogize its services
to the SEC's historical exception for those intermediaries who serve merely
as finders in transactions. 243 A broker is a fiduciary agent with duties that
extend beyond the matching stage. 2 44 A finder, by contrast, merely
introduces the parties and then exits, leaving the negotiations to others.
Because the finder's limited role affords few opportunities to impact sale
price or terms, the SEC has traditionally exempted finders from registration.
Although the line can be difficult to draw, the SEC has made clear that a
241

See International Business Exchange Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC

No-Act. LEXIS 3065, at *5 (Dec. 12, 1986) ("[A] professional who brings together
potential buyers and sellers and advises the parties on questions of value, plays an
integral role in negotiating the transaction, or provides other services designed to
facilitate the transaction, may be deemed to be a broker."); Wesco Equity Funding, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2634, at *2-*3 (Aug. 10, 1985) (same).
242 See Fulham & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4488, at
*2 (Dec. 20, 1972) (stressing the company's "proposed participation in negotiations with
respect to merger transactions" in requiring registration).
243 See Polanin, supra note 240, at 816-18 (reviewing SEC no-action letters).
244 Compare Burleson v. Earnest, 153 S.W.2d 869, 873-74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
(holding that real estate broker had fiduciary obligations and was not a mere
"middleman" or finder), with Williams v. Kinsey, 169 P.2d 487, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)
(finding that broker was merely a middleman who owed no duties beyond matching the
parties).
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finder that serves solely to match parties need not register. In Venture Capital
Network, Inc.,245 for example, the SEC exempted a computer-driven
matching service, emphasizing that the service did not provide any assistance
to the parties after making the introductory match. In other words, a finder
24 6
may bring the parties to the point of an initial handshake but no further.
245 Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1501, at *1-*2 (May 7, 1984).
246 When confronted with the parallel problem of distinguishing between finders
and brokers in real estate and small business transactions, state courts have consistently
focused on whether a finder participates in negotiations subsequent to introducing the
parties and on whether the principal granted the finder any authority to close the deal. See
12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 208 (1997):
In order to be regarded as a mere middleman ...the broker must not be invested
with the least discretion, and the... employer must have no right to rely on
obtaining the benefit of the broker's judgment. If the broker takes, or contracts to
take, any part in the negotiations, the broker cannot be regarded as a mere
middleman, no matter how slight a part it may be."
The rationale is that a finder who merely introduces parties need not be as
knowledgeable about the transaction as a broker who engages in negotiations. See, e.g.,
Tyrone v. Kelley, 507 P.2d 65, 72 (Cal. 1973) ("One who merely introduces two parties
to a real estate transaction, whether or not he solicits those persons, does not need to be as
knowledgeable about real estate transactions as a licensed broker, unless, of course, he
participates in the negotiations."). Titles, however, do little to clarify the confusion. As
the courts have noted, "the dispositive issue of fiduciary-like duty or no such duty is
determined not by the nomenclature 'finder' or 'broker' or even 'agent,' but instead by
the services agreed to under the contract between the parties." Northeast Gen. Corp. v.
Wellington Adv., 624 N.E.2d 129, 132 (N.Y. 1993). To avoid the definitional problem,
some courts have held that under some state real estate licensing statutes all finders are in
fact brokers. In Wickersham v. Harris,313 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963), for example, the
Tenth Circuit found that the District of Columbia's real estate statute included finders
within the definition of broker, despite the fact that courts interpreting California's nearly
identical provision had found a distinction between the two roles. See id. at 471-72; see
also George Nangen & Co. v. Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 238 F.Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.
Wisc. 1965) (finder of a buyer for a business was a "real estate broker"); Broughall v.
Black Forest Dev. Co., 593 P.2d 314, 315 (Colo. 1978) (finder of a buyer for a radio
station was a "real estate broker"); Baird v. Krancer, 246 N.Y.S. 85, 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1930) (holding that finders must be brokers, else a broker could avoid the statute's reach
"simply by calling himself a finder, an originator,an introducer, instead of a broker")
(emphasis added); Alford v. Raschiatore, 63 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super Ct. 1949)
(bringing parties together for discussions qualifies as "negotiation of the resulting sale");
Schmitt v. Coad, 604 P.2d 507, 510 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
Although the distinction has sometimes been unclear, it is important. Many states bar
recovery of fees if an intermediary is found to have acted as a real estate broker but
without a license, even if the intermediary believed that he was merely serving as a finder
(and thus did not require a license). The broker or finder thus stands to lose its fee for
failure to be properly licensed. As a result, such regulations have an in terrorem effect.
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Recently, however, the SEC has taken a more narrow view of the socalled finder's exception. In 1985, the Commission considered a request
from Dominion Resources, Inc., a financial services firm. Dominion asked
whether it would be required to register as a broker if it assisted issuers of
securities by analyzing their finances, recommending bond lawyers and
underwriters, and introduced the issuers to commercial bankers who would
act as the initial purchasers of the securities. Dominion represented that the
only contact it would have with the commercial bank/purchaser was the
introduction of the issuer to the bank. The SEC issued a no-action letter to
Dominion, indicating that it would not take action against Dominion for not
247
registering as a broker-dealer.
The SEC revoked this opinion in March 2000.248 The SEC stated that
since 1985, "the staff has frequently considered the question of when a
person is a broker that must register... and when a person is merely a
'finder' that is not subject to registration ....More recently, the staff has
denied no-action requests in situations somewhat similar to the arrangement
described in the Dominion Resources . . . 1985 no-action letter. ' 249 More
generally, the SEC recently seems inclined to reach farther in its regulation
250
of brokerage and M&A activity.
Given this narrowing of the "finder's exception," there is no obvious
doctrinal safe harbor for a mediator. In arguing against application of the
broker registration requirements, therefore, a mediator would have to contend
that mediators pose no risk about which the SEC should be concerned. 25 1
Matchmakers are reluctant to engage in any kind of negotiation-and will push principals
to handle negotiations themselves-in order to avoid any appearance of engaging in
regulated activity. See REED & LAJoux, supra note 92, at 51 ("[I]t is extremely important
that the finder or broker not perform any act that a court could consider to be negotiation,
and make sure that the principals do all the negotiating and acknowledge it in writing.").
247 Dominion Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2511, at *8 (Aug. 22, 1985).
248 Dominion Resources, Inc., SEC Revocation Letter, 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
304, at *4 (Mar. 7, 2000).
249 Id.at 3.
250 See 1st Global, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 557, at
*8 (May 7, 2001) (partially denying no-action relief to a broker seeking to pay
commissions to certified public accountants); John R. Wirthlin, SEC No-Action Letter,
1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 83 at *2-*3 (Jan. 19, 1999) (denying no-action relief to a
finder who proposed to contact tax accountants and other professionals whose clients
might be interested in investing in a real estate limited partnership).
251 See David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH.U. L.
REv. 899, 900 (1987) (arguing that the test for registration should be whether the activity
will "create risks comparable to those arising from the activities of customary brokerdealers").
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The broker-dealer registration requirements were created to protect the public
and the securities markets. The underlying rationale is that brokers and other
intermediaries giving advice regarding major transactions can inflate prices,
misuse funds, or otherwise undermine the securities markets, and therefore
must be regulated.
Does the rationale extend to transactional mediators? On the one hand, it
seems strange to require a mediator to register as a broker and be regulated as
a broker given that the mediator is not actually going to engage in
"brokerage" in the traditional sense. The mediator will broker the deal, but
not as a partisan agent. A mediator is not tainted by the incentive problems
that might affect a traditional broker, 25 2 nor does a non-binding mediator
have any authority to force transacting parties to structure their deal in a
particular way.
On the other hand, a mediator in a major merger would certainly be in a
position to impact the transaction. In fact, a mediator might have more ability
than a partisan broker to influence the overall structure of the deal. A
mediator might help parties structure legal terms, allocate risk, and manage
due diligence. She might mediate emotional issues and help to find valuecreating trades. In some cases she might be used to resolve disagreements
about price. In addition, although a mediator might not take a percentagebased fee, she would have reputational and other personal incentives to try to
close the deal. Mediators are not perfect, and inevitably mediators might try
to influence securities-related transactions to serve their own interests. 253 To
the extent that the SEC has a role to play in regulating negotiations involving
major securities transactions, it therefore seems likely that it might seek to
254
extend 3(a)(4) to mediators.
252 For a general discussion of fee structures in dispute mediation, see Peppet, supra
note 124.
253 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the agency and
incentive problems presented by introducing a mediator).
254 Another question is whether a lawyer-mediator would be required to register.
Currently lawyers and accountants are excepted from the broker-dealer registration
requirements. The source of that exception is a 1980 SEC no action letter. Garrett Kushell
Associates, SEC No Action Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3744, at *1-*2 (Sept. 7,
1980). That no action letter addressed a real estate broker's concern about registration.
Although the underlying facts did not involve an attorney, the SEC's letter stated that
"persons (other than professionals such as lawyers or accountants acting as such) who
play an integral role in negotiations and effecting mergers or acquisitions ... are required
to register as broker-dealers." Id. (emphasis added). The question therefore turns on
whether a lawyer-mediator is acting as a lawyer in the sense that the SEC requires to fall
within this exception. Although whether mediation constitutes the practice of law has
been a much-debated topic, the new Model Rule 2.4 makes clear that parties to a
mediation should not consider a lawyer-mediator to be their attorney. See Joshua R.
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b. The Investment Advisers Act
In addition to the broker-dealer registration requirements, a mediator
might fall within the provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.255
Under that Act, an investment adviser is "any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others ...as to the value of securities or
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities." 256 As
with the broker-dealer registration requirements, applying this provision to
mediators is a bit of a stretch. Although some mediators might give advice or
recommendations regarding the value of securities or "as to the advisability
of purchasing" securities, many-particularly those focused more on the
relational aspects of a transaction-might not. Part II concludes that
mediators are more likely to be of value in the closing stages of a merger or
acquisition, not during the pricing stage. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that
some mediators could engage in regulated activities under the Act.
(Intriguingly, one of the respondents to my survey indicated that he was a
registered investment advisor and that this gave him a competitive advantage
in transactional mediation.) Such mediators would thus be required to
register with the SEC.
c. Consequences of Confusion
Regulation as either a broker or an investment adviser could have serious
consequences for a transactional mediator. Brokers must register with the
NASD on Form BD, which involves disclosure of corporate and financial
information. 257 A registered broker must meet certain record-keeping and
minimum asset requirements. Similarly, the Investment Advisers Act
imposes a duty to disclose potential conflicts of interest, including all fees
Schwartz, Note, Laymen Cannot Lawyer, But Is Mediation The Practice Of Law?, 20

CARDOZO L. REV. 1715 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in
Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 156 n.19 (1999) (providing
citations); see also Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct, R. 2.4(b) (2002) ("A lawyer serving
as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not
representing them."). Assuming this view to be correct, the SEC is unlikely to except
lawyer-mediators from the registration requirement. Instead, a lawyer serving as a
mediator in the closing stage of a merger or acquisition involving the sale of securities
would likely find herself just as subject to the SEC's requirements an any other mediator.
255 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
256 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
257 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.501(a) (2003). Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
requires financial disclosure. 15 U.S.C. 78o(a) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(7)
(requiring that broker-dealers comply with SEC's financial conditions regarding
solvency).
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and fee arrangements; regulates advertising and an adviser's performance
claims; requires record-keeping of personal securities transactions; and
controls referral arrangements. These provisions could present barriers to
entry for mediators.
At the very least, the SEC should take transactional mediators into
account and issue clear guidelines for their practice in the M&A context. I
would argue that mediators should not be required to register as brokers,
given that they do not serve as agents and thus that many of the brokerregistration requirements-such as minimum asset requirements-are illsuited to mediator practice. To extend 3(a)(4) to mediators would stretch the
provision beyond reason. Similarly, not all mediators should be required to
register as investment advisers. Only those that actively engage in valuing
securities and making substantive recommendations on their purchase should
fall within the Investment Advisers Act. At the same time, I would concede
that the SEC might take an interest in mediators, particularly given that a
mediator could be instrumental in the structuring and negotiation of a merger
or acquisition involving securities. To truly take account of mediators,
ideally a new category of regulations and requirements would be applied to
their practice. Regardless of the form such regulation takes; however, some
action is needed to reduce the uncertainty that a mediator would currently
face in this regard.
B. Implicationsfor Attorneys and Mediators: Overcoming Barriersto
More Widespread Use of TransactionalMediators
This Article obviously has implications for mediators, lawyers, and
transacting principals. It suggests that mediators can improve upon agentassisted deals in some circumstances. Nevertheless, I expect that many
dealmakers will resist the notion of incorporating a mediator into their
transactional negotiations. This section briefly considers some of the barriers
that transactional mediators likely face, and how they might be overcome. In
particular, I argue that existing ethical rules that require attorneys to advise
litigating clients about alternative dispute resolution should be extended to
encourage-but not require-transactional lawyers to do likewise.
1. Barriersto Entry
a. Habit
The most significant barrier to entry for transactional mediators is most
likely habit. Dealmakers are accustomed to contracting in a certain way, with
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certain agents. They may be reluctant to change the status quo process,
particularly if the stakes are high.
b. Optimistic Overconfidence
Research has shown that negotiating parties tend to be overconfident in
their own assessments, predictions, and abilities, and that they tend to be
2 58
overly optimistic about their chances of success in their endeavors.
Litigants, for example, predict their own success more often than is
warranted. It is likely that transacting parties similarly assume that their deal
will succeed. More importantly, perhaps, buyers and sellers seem likely to
assume that they can conclude a deal and find all of the available gains from
trade without mediator assistance.
As discussed above, Howard Raiffa's experiment with corporate
executives demonstrated that transacting parties sometimes overlook
available gains from trade. 2 59 Nevertheless, when Raiffa offered these
executives the use of a mediator to facilitate their bargaining, many failed to
take him up on his offer. According to Raiffa, few executives in his study
made use of the available mediator:
Most felt that the mediator knew nothing of the details, so they saw no
advantage in complicating their problem with the inclusion of a third party;
believing that their negotiating adversaries would not give truthful
information to the mediator, they saw no reason why they themselves
should. Those who used the mediator did "better" (in a... joint sense), but
they were surprised to find out that they had done better-after all,
everything they had done with the mediator they could have done without
260
the mediator, or so they thought.

Raiffa found that, despite their confidence, the executives who did not use
the available mediator did worse than those groups that asked for a mediator.
This illustrates that sophisticated parties may be sufficiently overconfident in
their own abilities that they will ignore the potential benefits of mediator
assistance.
Such overconfidence is likely to be even more pronounced outside of the
laboratory. Businesspeople establish reputations for their negotiating
prowess. Lawyers, bankers, and brokers may likewise pride themselves on
258 For an overview of optimistic overconfidence in negotiations, see Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 45, 46-50 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
259 See supra notes 15 & 138 and accompanying text (describing experiment).
260 RAIFFA, supra note 15, at 102.
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their ability to get a deal done and squeeze all the available value out of that
deal. Such dealmakers may have great difficulty accepting that a mediator
could in any way add value to their transactions.
c. Strategic Resistance
The choice to use a mediator is in itself a bargaining problem. To the
extent that a party fears that using a mediator will result in a worse outcome
for that party, the party may resist adding a mediator. 26 1 The parties'
negotiation over whether to hire a mediator may not be as difficult to resolve
as their underlying substantive differences, 262 but one or both may resist
mediator intervention because of doubts about its strategic implications.
A contracting party may also fear that suggesting mediator intervention
will in itself signal weakness. Mergers, acquisitions, and other high-stakes
transactions are often carried out with a certain bravado. Successful
dealmakers may worry that proposing to hire a mediator will be interpreted
as an implicit admission of inability or fear. More problematic still, an
opposing party might believe that the suggestion to bring in a mediator
portends difficulties down the road-that the proposer is signaling that the
deal is likely to be close to collapse at some point. In the transactional world,
parties may go to great lengths to avoid any such suggestion.
d. Agency Barriers
In addition to the principals' reluctance to use a mediator, lawyers,
bankers, brokers, and other agents that currently assist in transactions may
resist mediator assistance. 263 An agent may fear that if a mediator can find
261 See generally Brown & Ayres, supra note 31; see also Howard Raiffa, The
Neutral Analyst: Helping Parties to Reach Better Solutions, in NEGOTIATION:
STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN 14, 17 (Lavinia Hall ed., 1993) (describing this problem).
For a general description of an analogous problem in another context, see also Stephen
Craig Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-ReducingInstitutions:
The Successes and Failuresof Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229 (1995)
(examining resistance to creating Chicago Board of Trade caused by the distributive
effects of implementing a new, more efficient trading system).
262 See, e.g., Vincent P. Crawford, The Role of Arbitration and the Theory of
Incentives, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 363, 370-71 (Alvin E. Roth ed.
1985) (arguing that parties can overcome the "choice of arbitrator" problem and that
"[b]argainers might easily have better luck in agreeing on an arbitrator than in agreeing
on a settlement").
263 Some agents-particularly brokers-may fear that a mediator will reduce or
eliminate their fees. Common law has traditionally held that a broker or finder must be
the "procuring cause" of a transaction in order to be entitled to his commission (unless
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otherwise-overlooked value-creating trades, the agent's clients will begin to
doubt the agent's skills as a negotiator. Lawyers may be particularly reluctant
to allow a mediator into their negotiations, given that transactional attorneys
often pride-and sell-themselves on their bargaining abilities. More
generally, to the extent that a mediator can help parties to monitor their
agents (and thus reduce agency costs), agents have an inherent incentive to
resist the use of such mediators. Finally, a lawyer or other agent may fear
that a client will turn exclusively to using a mediator, completely eliminating
the agent from transactions.
e. Fear of TransactionCosts
Finally, contracting parties or their agents may fear that mediators will
do little but increase transaction costs. As Raiffa's experiment suggested,
transacting parties may believe that a mediator can do little for them that they
cannot do for themselves. 264 If a mediator cannot demonstrate that her
services will consistently add value, it will be hard to overcome these
assumptions.
For example, it is well known that negotiators tend to assume that they
face a zero-sum situation rather than an opportunity with value-creating or
integrative potential. 265 One study, for example, found that 68% of
negotiators assumed that there would be no opportunity to make valuecreating trades. 26 6 This "fixed pie bias" could preclude dealmakers from

his contract specifies otherwise). If another broker successfully intervenes to negotiate in
the transaction, the first broker may not be entitled to his commission. This raises the
possibility that if a mediator facilitated the closing of a deal, various brokers might have
cause for concern about whether they would receive their fees. See Moehling v.
Brickman, 240 N.E.2d 210, 213 (111. 1968) (holding that no commission is due where
there is an "intervening instrumentality which may be regarded as the effective or
efficient cause of the sale") (citations omitted); Modem Tackle Co. v. Bradley Indus.,
Inc., 297 N.E.2d 688, 693 (1il. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that finder who introduced parties
was not entitled to fees because of intervening agency); Whitcomb v. Bacon, 49 N.E.
742, 743 (Mass. 1898) (holding that where a second broker effects the sale, only that
broker recovers fees absent a contract to the contrary). Current brokerage contracts
modify this common law rule, and existing agents could almost certainly deal with the
problem by modifying their contracts to ensure their fees even were a mediator used to
close the transaction.
264 See supra notes 15 and 138; see also text accompanying note 138.
265 See generally Max H. Bazerman, Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the
RationalityAssumption, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 211 (1983).
266 Leigh Thompson & Reid Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47 ORG.
BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 98, 107 (1990).
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employing a mediator if a significant component of a mediator's value
derives from helping the parties to optimize their deal.
In addition, parties may fear costs associated with changing their
negotiation process. Contracting parties are consumers of a bargaining
process. Changing that process requires overcoming various switching
costs. 267 There may be search costs in finding a mediator that one trusts and
that has the expertise needed to assist. There will also be learning costs: the
parties will incur costs in learning how to close deals using a mediator, as
opposed to through purely face-to-face bargaining. There may also be
contractual switching costs if a party has contractual obligations to continue
using a given agent, broker, law firm, or investment banker and will be
268
formally or informally penalized for changing the status quo.
2. Should TransactionalLawyers Be Required to Advise
Contracting ClientsAbout Mediation?
There are no easy solutions to these problems. Like the evolution of
alternative dispute resolution processes in the litigation context, it will take
time to promote and tailor mediator services in transactions. Part IV showed
that some demand already exists for such services, and that mediators are
sometimes intervening in contract formation. To further promote the use of
transactional mediators, the legal and mediation communities should
consider efforts to educate parties and their lawyers, and the possibility of
requiring attorneys to advise transacting clients about the potential benefits
of mediators.
a. Education
In terms of education, three main points seem the most important. First,
mediators, the ADR community, and the organized bar must educate both
parties and their agents about the potential benefits of mediator intervention
in contracting. Existing education efforts completely overlook the possibility
of mediator assistance with pre-closing contract bargaining. 269 Such efforts
267 See Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q. J. ECON.
375, 375-77 (1987) (describing various types of switching costs).
268 Parties in the M&A context, for example, might fear changing the bargaining
process to introduce mediators. There might be monetary or reputational sanctions for
doing so. A corporation, for example, might lose most favored nation status with its
bankers if it suggested that a mediator could add value that the investment bank's fee
structure prevented it from capturing. The implicit criticism in switching could be taken
poorly, and the existing quasi-mediator agent might punish the principal for doing so.
269 See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, Giving Meaning to the Second Generationof ADR
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must overcome this failure. Through education, mediators can try to assuage
strategic fears by explaining that the process is non-binding and that the party
will not be forced into anything. Similarly, mediators can try to reassure
lawyers, bankers, or other agents that employing mediators-and potentially
reaching a better deal for their clients-will not reflect poorly on their
performance as agents. This is a difficult road, and it will not always
succeed. Nevertheless, if lawyers and other agents begin to understand the
benefits that a mediator can bring, they will ultimately choose to use such
mediators when it will best satisfy their clients' interests.
Second, mediator services in the transactional context should be tailored
to those deals in which a mediator can create the most value. This Article has
made the case for transactional mediators, but the argument comes with
caveats and qualifications. It will do more harm than good to the notion of
transactional mediators to promote their intervention in contexts in which
there is little for them to do. Mediators must therefore be trained to
understand when their services will be valuable in transactions so that they
do not overextend their reach.
Finally, assuming that mediators follow this advice, parties can be taught
that the transaction costs added by employing a mediator are likely to be
relatively minor compared to either the value of the transaction or the value
that they can create. In a large merger, acquisition, or joint venture, the
parties already spend huge sums on lawyers, bankers, and brokers. Given that
a transactional mediator would work on a flat or hourly fee, even if that fee
were extremely high, the mediator's added costs would be minor as
compared to the costs imposed by these other agents. Mediators should also
work to provide parties with metrics of the mediator's added value. Raiffa's
"contract embellishment" procedure, for example, has the advantage that the
mediator can demonstrate added value by comparing the pre-intervention
contract with the mediator's improved contract. To the extent possible,
mediators must work to quantify such Pareto-improvements for their clients.
b. An Ethical Requirementfor TransactionalAttorneys?
Whether a litigating attorney should have a duty to inform her client
about the availability of alternative dispute resolution processes has been
much debated. 270 Some have argued that such a requirement is implicit in
Education: Attorneys' Duty to Learn About ADR and What They Must Learn, 1999 J.

Disp. RESOL. 29, 30 (providing a "second generation" ADR primer for attorneys but not
considering the use of transactional mediators).
270 See Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of

ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 427, 462-76, app. I-llI (2000) (providing
extensive references to the debate and a bibliography of the topic).
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existing ethics rules that obligate an attorney to keep her client informed
about the status of her legal matter. 27 1 Others have urged more explicit
provisions that require attorneys to educate clients about ADR. Some courts
272
and bar associations have begun to implement such proposals.
Not surprisingly, these provisions are most often litigation-focused.
Without conducting an exhaustive survey here, even a quick review indicates
that these provisions generally require an attorney to certify that she has
made such ADR-related disclosures prior to filing court papers, or they are
worded to apply only to litigation. 27 3 The question, therefore, is whether such
provisions should be extended to corporate and transactional attorneys
working with dealmaking clients.
Complete analysis of this question is obviously beyond the scope of this
Article. In short, however, I believe that it would be appropriate for state
courts and bar associations to adopt an aspirational-but not mandatoryprovision that extends the ADR consultation requirement to transactional
attorneys. 274 As Marshall Breger has argued in the litigation context, "a
mandatory ADR consultation rule is only in part an attempt to dispense with
the role of attorney discretion. It is also an attempt to establish norms and
values that will subtly but surely provide the context for the use of that
271 See id. at 433-36 (reviewing such arguments).
272 See id. (discussing examples).
273 The State of Hawaii, for example, has modified its version of Model Rule 2.1 to
provide that "[iun a matter involving ...litigation, a lawyer should advise a client of
alternative forms of dispute resolution." HAW. R. S.CT. R.P.C. 2.1 (2003). Some states
have taken a more broad approach. Massachusetts, for example, requires that "there will
be circumstances in which a lawyer should advise a client concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of available dispute resolution options in order to permit the client to make
informed decisions concerning the representation." MASS. ANN. LAWS S. JUD. CT. R.
3:07, R.P.C. 1.4 (2003). Assuming that "available dispute resolution options" should be
read to include the use of transactional mediators, this provision is broad enough to apply
to the contracting context. Scholars' recommendations in this area are often litigationfocused as well. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 270, at 461 (proposing a revised comment
to Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 that "[a] lawyer should take into
consideration... alternatives to litigation.") (emphasis added); Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
ADR, the ABA, and Client Control:A Proposalthat the Model Rules Require Lawyers to
Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183, 184 (1999) (proposing
amendment to Model Rule 1.2 sufficiently broad to extend to transactional contexts but
only analyzing the proposal in the litigation domain).
274 It may be that a mandatory provision is justified in the litigation context, in
which an attorney may already have some duty to the court system to avoid unnecessary
litigation, but not in the transactional context, in which there is no analogous duty. See
Jackson v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 858 F. Supp. 464, 472 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (suggesting
that lawyers owe courts such a duty and thus should suggest mediation when
appropriate).
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discretion." 275 The process of debating and adopting such a provision in state
bar associations would educate a great many transactional attorneys about the
potential for mediator assistance.
At the same time, the use of transactional mediators is in its infancy. As
discussed above, currently a transactional mediation may not be privileged
under state law or even permitted under the securities regulations. To require
lawyers to promote such practices at this stage, therefore, seems premature.
Instead, transactional lawyers should be encouraged to discuss retaining a
mediator with their clients, but should not be disciplined for failing to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has made the case for transactional mediators. I have argued
that there are several theoretical justifications for third-party assistance in
transactions. By looking closely at transactional bargaining through the
various stages of a deal's life, one can see opportunities for a mediator to add
value. I have also presented preliminary evidence that such interventions are
already taking place. This suggests that the time has come to reconsider how
we define the scope and applicability of mediation. Rather than take a
formalist approach to mediation, defining it as a dispute resolution device
and thus limiting it to the disputing context, we should be more functional in
our analysis. By doing so one can see the possibilities for using mediation to
assist dealmakers with their transactional bargaining.

275 Breger, supra note 270, at 432.
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